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I became interested in Well 1m Film during my introductory courses in Mass
Communications at Oklahoma State University in the Fall of 1998, during which time l
was exposed to the various methods of research and to the various mass
communications theories. I had originally planned to conduct research into newsreels in
general, and specifically, into those newsreels of the Korean War era, 1950-52, those
that 1vaguely remember as a child. 1changed my approach, however, after I found
references to Wei! 1m Fdm in various publications, and I became intrigued with the
concept of the conqueror attempting to reeducate the conquered, and my research into
the series took off from there.
The first mateTlal I came across on rVel! 1m Film was written by such people as
Roger Smither and Wolfgang Klaue. Smither is the "Keeper of the Film" at the Imperial
War Museum in London, and has been involved in film research for many years. His
material prompted me to delve further into Well 1m Film, and that promptIng took me to
College Park, Maryland, near Washington, D.C., to the National Archives BUIlding
there I was able to locate many documents related to the series and correspondence
between AJlied film officials at the National Archives, and those documents and
correspondence are the basis afmy thesis.
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This thesis examines the psychological warfare, censorship and propaganda
aspects of Well un Fdm, a newsreel series produced by Britain and the United States for
showing to postwar German movie-goers in occupied West Germany. The thesis
focuses on three periods of Weir 1m Film; the first represented by the initial 13 issues,
produced for showing during May, June, July and early August J945, called herein the
"Psychological Warfare" period; the second represented by issues produced for showing
dunng August 1945 through mid-J 947, referred to herein as the "Informational" or
"'PoliticaJ Re-Education" period; and the third represented by issues produced for
showing during the mld~ 1947 to 1952 period, herem referred to as the
"Anti-Communist Propaganda" period. These three periods have been defined by the
author according to dominate themes of each era and the apparent desired effect of
those themes by the peopJe who produced the series.
Research Problem
Well ,m Ftlm is studied in the context of overall Allied film policy for Ge-rman.
audiences and in the context of the Marshall Plan, and speci fically, its re~education
efforts. Numerous examples of correspondence, policy statements and directives that
circulated among civilians and military personnel who were involved in the productIOn
of Well 1m FtLm were used in this research project. Taken as a whole, these documents
demonstrate a deliberate propaganda and censorship campaign by Allied officials aimed
at re-educating the Gennan people.
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[n addition to correspondence rel.ated directJy to Welt 1m Film, copies of letters
have been obtained that illustrate Allied film policy in terms of what military leaders
would a.llow and not allow Gennan audiences to view. For example, in a 1946 letter to
the Film, Theater and Music Control Branch of the U.S. Forces in the European
Theater, Brig. Gen. Robert A McClure, director oflnformatioll1 Control, ordered that
The Malte,...'e Falcon be withdrawn from circulatIon in Germany because the film
"simply perpetuates the Goebbels' Chicago gangster propaganda line.... " He expressed
astonishment that it b~1.d been allowed to play in Gennan tbeaters. I
Another Jetter from a colonel in fnfonnation Control describes those elements
that would make a film unsuitable for Gennan audiences. Films that "glorify ideology
of FaSCIsm, Nazism and racial distinction," or "subvert or pervert German history," or
"ridicule ... AJJjed peoples, their governments, their political or national leaders" were
forbidden 2 Other communications obtained include lists of Hollywood feature films
deemed suitable or unsuitable for showing in occupied Germany. .l
In addition to policy statements, guidelines, correspondence and other
documents obtained from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, actual Welt
1m FlIm issues are used in this thesis to illustrate prevailing themes in an effon to
understand the philosophies behind the series during the three periods under study.
Issue No. 13 4 is used to j llustrate these things in the first era, Issue No. 82 5 is used for
the serond era, and segments from various issues produced during the Berlin Airlift in
1948 and 19496 are used for the third era. Issue No. 13 of Well im Film was used
primarily because of its ready availability at the National Archives. An examination of
one of the t1 rst 10 issues would have been ideal, but none of those issues are avai lable
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for viewing at the National Archives. Issue No. 82 was used to illustrate the second era
under study because it represents an overview of 1946 and could be analyzed as a
summation of that year. Entire Welt im Film issues from the third period being studied
were not available at the NationaJ Archives, so a compilation of Berlin Airlift footage
was used for the analysis of the third era.
Research Questions
The Welt im Film newsreel series can be divided roughly into three periods. The
first extended from the end of the war until August 1945, and was a period of "control
propaganda" and of "psychological warfare," during which the Allies felt the need to
punish the Gennans for their role in World War 11 while teaching them the virtues of
Democracy. The second period extended to mid-1947, during which time the series
began to resemble an actual newsreel series with reports from around the globe, but
with heavy censorship and subject matter approved only at the highest level of the
military command. The third period extended from the middle of 1947, through the
Berlin Airlift, and into the early 1950s, and was basically a period of anti-Communist
propaganda.
The research questions for this thesis are: What was the extent of the Allied
propaganda and censorship policy in the newsreel series Welt im Film during the
various eras in the context of overall film policy toward postwar Germany? How was
that policy carried out? Was this policy effective?
To answer these questions, correspondence among various military and civiltan
officials involved in the production of Welt im Film and in film distribution to occupied
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Germany in general are examined to determine overall film policy and how that policy
applied to Welt im Film. Shifts in policy over the period being studied are also noted.
Significance of Study
This study attempts to determine the state of propaganda and censorship
immediately following World War H as it was applied to films viewed by German
audiences. The study offers an insight into such efforts in generaJ, but is also of value in
determining the effectiveness of this particular effort in shaping German society and
government during the postwar period to the present day.
Was the effort a success? Were the Germans "fe-educated,., as Allied officials
had envisioned? The current status of German government, which by most estimations
is a legitimate democracy, would suggest that the effort was a success, and that the
Germans were, indeed, re-educated in Western ways. But at what price? Was the truth
sacrificed to any degree to achieve this end? And if so, can it be justified? And how
much credit can such efforts as Welt 1m Film take?
Background
Movie-goers in postwar Germany were treated to a mandatory dose of Well irn
Film, which was designed to hammer home defeat and guilt themes and '"'we have a
plan" democratic idealism. But the series was designed to punish, as well, and so the
German people were presented with harsh images ofGermans being executed,
something German prisoners of war held in Britain said even the Nazis would not have
done. 7
Welt im Film represented typical propaganda, that process of "deliberately
manipulated communication"g described by Harold D. Lasswell as ''"the technique of
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influencing human action by the manipulation ofrepresentations." 9 The newsreels
were intended to (I) let the Gennans know that they had been totally defeated, (2)
instill a sense of guilt by presenting images of the atrocities committed by their country,
(3) inflict punishment on the Gennans for atrocities committ~ and (4) otfer a plan
through which they might gain '"the joys and beauties of the Democratic way of life." 10
Following the war, the remnants of the outlawed National Socialists Party of
Gennany, or the Nazis, in an effort to destroy the U.S.-Britain-Soviet alliance created
by the Yalta agreements, attempted to instigate an East-West conflict. II The purpose of
Welt im Film was, in part, to help quell those efforts. The Allies also were concerned at
the time that many Gennans might not accept the fact that their country had been
defeated and might entertain the notion that they had control over their own destiny, so
the AJlied-produced newsreels hammered home the image of "an unconditionaJ
surrender" by "a beaten Gennany:' and that the defeat of the country was "complete,
final and absolute." 12
Those messages were accentuated by images ofAllied victory parades and
victorious American GIs hugging their sweethearts and wlves. And while footage
contained in Allied-produced newsreels shown in America was accompanied by
cheerful, motivational music and narration, the same footage shown 10 Gennany was
presented with depressing music and "icy"' narrationU
The 1ntent of those newsreels and the overall mass media propaganda effort was
not so much to humiliate the Gennans, for that would accomplish little, but to prod
them into seeing "the cost in human agony and physical destruction that their
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aggression has cost the civihzed world" and 10 offer them "the benefits of
democracy" 14
The first issues of the newsreel series were prepared by Western specialists in
psychological warfare working for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF).I) Preparations for Welt im Film began in London before total victory by the
Allies over Gennany had actually been achieved The series would be driven by two
factors~ the primacy of the fonnula "unconditional surrender," and by the rivalry with
NatlOnalkomitee Freles Deutschland (NKFS), supported by the Soviet Union. 16 Well im
Film represented a steJrby-step effort of"re-education and reorientation of the Gennan
people after their defeat; their postwar thinking and their conduct were to comply with
the 'democratic way oflife'."17
The first few issues were compiled in London in mid-1945 before the entire
operation moved in the faJl of that year to Munich in the U.S. occupation zone. I~ The
newsreel, before the move to Munich, presented an extremely harsh interpretation of
occupational policy, stressing Gennan defeat and Allied supremacy, and actually
showed the execution of Gennan "spies and saboteurs." By the IOth issue of the series,
those execution scenes were dropped because of predictably negative audience reaction.
Gennans, filmmakers were infonnelL did not see the alJeged crimes these spies had
committed~ they only saw Gennans being shot. And from prisoner of war camps in
Britain, Gennans who saw the newsreels complained that "execution scenes (such as
these) would not have been portrayed even in Nazi Gennany.'- 19
FoliowlOg initial issues, the emphasis was switched to the victims of war crimes
and to the Nuremberg Trials. The quality of the newsreel also improved with the move
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to Munich and with the acquisition of local staff to shoot footage previously shot by
American service units. The major themes ofdefeat, retribution and postwar planning
were supplemented with international stories, making Welt im Film content more like
that of newsreels shown elsewhere in the world.!O Most of the issues released during
the period between the end of the war in Europe in early 1945 and the end of the war
with Japan in the fall of that year dealt with American victories in the Pacific, as well as
the atrocities committed by the GenTIans. These themes were intended to illustrate that
not only had the Germany that committed those atrocities been defeated, but its allies
were falling as welL 21 In August of 1945, the producers of Well im Film began using
Gennans to "teach" democracy to their own people.22 This was near the end of the
period of "control propaganda" or "psychological warfare" by Well 1m Fdm, designed
to create and maintain order. 2J
Major changes in the way material was presented also occurred in 1947 with
increasing pressures of the Cold War. Prior to that time, the Soviet Union had been
portrayed as an ally of the United States, but during 1947, efforts increased in Well 1m
Film to dissuade Gennans from accepting communism and socialism and to persuade
them to accept democracy and its benefits. By the time the Berlin Airlift was in full
swing in June 1948, Welt im Film wa<; full-blown propaganda from the Westem side
against the Soviet Union and Communism.24
Availability of Source Material
aod Methodology
Much of the secondary resource material for this study has heen listed in the
section above with endnotes, and in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Literature Review
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section. Primary resource material is comprised of actual correspondence obtained from
the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, near Washington, D.C., that was
circulated among military and civilian officials involved in the production of Welt im
Film. The National Archives material has been sorted chronologically and according to
its direct application to the various Well im Film eras and according to its relationship
to overall Allied film policy for occupied Gennany.
The primary methodology for this study is historical narration of the
development of Welt im Film itself in the context of overall Allied film policy. It is
also a historical analysis of the decision-making processes that went into the production
of Welt im Film, based on correspondence and other documents available as primary
resource material.
A total of 369 issues of Welt im Film were produced, with the first issue released
18 May 1945, and the last on 27 June 1952. 25 The collection up to 1950, when Britain
withdrew from the program, is currently held by the Imperial War Museum in London.
Roger Smither, Keeper of the Film for the museum, has published many guides to film
holdings, including The Ra/fle uflhe Somme and Well im Film, /9-15-/950. Copies of
aU but the first 10 issues are also available for viewing at the National Archives in
College Park, Maryland.
The Imperial War Museum's Department of Film holds more than 60 million
feet of film, with substantial holdings from the United States and from fonner enemy
sources shot by various service units. Important documentaries, television compilations
and feature films are also held by the museum, all of which are available for viewing by
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those with legitimate research interests. Application must be made in writing to the
Keeper of the Film, Imperial War Museum, Lambeth Road, London SEI 2HZ.
A web site managed by the School ofConservation Sciences, Bournemouth
University, UK, provides additional information on film and other features of the
museum. 26
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Wilbur Schramm, widely known as the founder of modem communication
study, once said; "The difficulty in summing up a field like human communication is
that it has no land that is exclusively its own. Communication is the fundamental social
process." I The literature is replete with information on the effects of various forms of
communications, especially film, on society. Theories abound on the extend of
influence the various communications media have on the individual and on society. 2
Propaganda and Persuasion
Propaganda is described by Harold D. Lasswell as "the technique of inlluencing
human action by the manipulation of representations." 3 In 1952, F.H. Lund presented
the "Law of Primacy in Persuasion," which basically states that the first information
presented becomes primary, or the most lasting.4 Carl Hovland refers to "recommended
opinion," and describes the process by which a communicator can offer an opinion that
acts as a stimulus for a listener to take steps in changing his or her own opinion. 5 The
psychological basis of opinion as it applies to attitudes toward Russia give a foundation
for anti-Communist propaganda aimed at Gennany following World War II. iJ
Propaganda is described as an essential element in warfare, dating to
pre-Biblical times. ft was, however, during World War f that sophisticated techniques of
propaganda were utilized that eventually created negative attitudes in the 20th century
toward both propaganda and the potential dangers of mass media influ~nce.7
12
The word "propaganda" itself is often used for propaganda purposes.
Propaganda becomes what the enemy engages in, while one's own propaganda parades
under the disguise of "information and publicity." 8
During the waning months of World War II, Allied efforts to end the war by
non-military means increased. The British War Cabinet Committee on Methods of
Breaking the German Will to Resist was assigned the task of devising methods for
speeding up the end of the war in Europe with propaganda and psychological warfare
methods.9 After hostilities ended, the Allies set out immediately to "politically
re-educate" the Germans with the use of radio and other media. 10
After World War II, propaganda efforts by both sides of the Cold War increased
dramatically, and became a major weapon in the ideological struggle between East and
West. The actual effects of propaganda are in dispute, however. Studies of attitude
change through communication have yielded varying results. Some studies suggest that
there is no substantial change in opinions following communication, others show a shift
of opinion toward the communication, and others show shifts in both directions, some
toward and some away from the communication. II
Film Propaganda
The value of propaganda in film was recognized from the outset. The idea of
using film to shape ideas, to persuade people to think a certain way, came when
pictures first moved. 12 But the defining moment in history for the development of film
propaganda came just before and during World War I, when vanous countries produced
propaganda films to gain popular support for their war efforts. 13 The British
government was successful in rallying its citizens against Gennan aggression, while the
....
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United States at first produced propaganda designed to persuade citizen.s to remain
neutral and avoid war, then, when it became apparent that entry into the war was
unavoidable, switched to a "war mode" in an effort to rally citizens behind a war
effort. 14
George Creel, chief of the U.S. Committee on Public Information, a World War
1agency, was assigned to produce material designed to convince Americans that the
country's involvement in the war was necessary. He describes the function of the
Committee on Public Information this way:
... It was of the greatest importance that America in th.is war should be
represented not merely as a strong man fully armed, but as a strong man
fully anned and believing in the cause for which he was fightmg. It was
necessary to have somebody who understood why we were at war, and in
saying that I speak not of a man who could comprehend merely the
difficult international problems with regard to it, but the spirit that made
us go into this war, and the things we were fighting for. Wars are
sometimes fought for land, sometimes for dynastic aspiration, and
sometimes for ideas and ideals. We were fighting for ideas and ideals,
and somebody who realized that, and knew it, had to say it and keep on
saying it until it was believed. That was a part of the function of the
Committee on Public Information. IS
As the war in Europe continued, films produced in the United States became
more and more critical of the Germans. Feature movies with war-related narratives
Included Hate-the-Hun propaganda, exemplified by titles such as the Kaiser, lhe Reast
ofBerlin, and The Prusswn Cur. 16
Creel's work greatly influenced the Why We Fight series of films produced for
the World War If effort. The series is considered by many to be the most influential and
persuasive effort in modem times in rallying citizens to a cause. 17 Frank Capra, creator
of the series, quotes General George C. Marshall; "To win this war we must win the
-
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battle for men's minds."'8 Capra's prewar portrayals of the American hero made him
the ideal choice for producing the series. !'J
Propaganda approaches during war have varied from country to country. The
differences, for example, between British methods and German methods are spelled out
by Michael Balfour.·20 Balfour notes that the British gave priority to individual freedom
and rights, while the Germans emphasized discipline and order.
Though resembling one another in certain outward respects, and in
particular as regards to trappings of industrialization, they (Germany and
England) had developed under different pressures and at different
speeds. The result was a fundamental difference of outlook between the
<Mother Country' and 'Fatherland', between the country which had
pioneered the <Bourgeois' and 'Industrial' revolution, where
'modernisation' (sic) was largely imposed from above by a 'paternal'
govemment.·21
Comparisons between the film propaganda methods used by the United States
and Japan prior to and during World War IJ are provided In a series of essays in The
Japan America Film Wars: WWII Prupaganda und Its Cultural Contexts ~~ Methods
used by Joseph Goebbels for film propaganda for the NaZIS in World War II produced
remarkable successes in swaying public opinion. Goebbels believed that the rank and
file '<are more primitive than we imagine," and propaganda must therefore "always be
essentially simple and repetitive." 23 Some have come to the conclUSIOn that the Allies
used many of the same devices used by the Nazis in their own documentary films on the
war. 24 The British effort in garnering public support for the war was produced by the
Crown Film Unit,25 and conformed to the true traditions of the Why We FIght series
produced by Capra.
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The True Glury, the last great combat documentary made during the second
world war, is considered a grand success in an artistic sense, but a failure in terms of its
initial goal of showing unity in AI lied operations.26 British and American filmmakers
who were part of the Joint Anglo-American Film Planning Committee, producers of the
film, found themselves at odds over production techniques, and consequently, presented
the image of Allied disunity. 27
Following World War II, the information policy of the American military
government in Germany undoubtedly played an imponant role in providing
consensus-building information and interpretation by the shaping of stories related to
Germany in the nation's newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts and newsreels. 28
Newsreel Beginnings
Before television, the largest group of consumers ofvisual media were
movie-goers. Prior to 1952, before television had gamed its widespread "non-elite"
audience, some 64 million Americans received a dose of "feel good" patriotism each
week in the fonn of a newsreel. 29
The first film ever, made in 1895 by the Lumlere brothers of France, was La
sorlie des Wilnes Lumiere, a Lyon-Montplaisir (workmen leaving the Lumiere factory at
Lyon-Montplaisir), and was a newsreel in a very real way. It was followed by others, all
a short view of real life situations. 30
From these beginnings, the step to filming official visits, catastrophes and other
events was a short one. By 1896, the Lurnlere brothers engaged Felix MesgUlch, who
was to become the world's first film reporter. Mesguich began traveling allover Europe




Most historians view the Marshall Plan as a critical step toward reviving the
economies of Europe following World War II. The Marshall Plan was designed to
overcome the economic bottlenecks and make available the short supplies that the
European community needed from the United States. 31
The economic foundations laid by the plan were intended, in pan, to provide a
Western defense against Soviet pressureY The unity of Westem Europe that resulted
from the Marshal I Plan is manifested today in the Common Market, NATO, and other
institutions. 34
The Marshall Plan was initiated by then Secretary of State George C. Marsha.1l
in June 1947,35 however, the primary architect and chief negotiator of the plan was
William L. Clayton, at that time the State Department's under secretary for economic
affairs. 36 Before Marshall announced his plan to the Harvard graduatmg class in June
1947, Clayton had already laid the foundation for the plan by successfully negotiating
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a massive and unprecedented
undertaking. 37
Tbe MarshaJi Plan Film Policy
Although the We" im Film series began more than a year before the Marshall
Plan was announced, the overall Allied film effort became a big part of the plan J8
Albert E. Hemsing supervised production of more than 100 documentary films that
were produced by the Marshall Plan's European Film Unit In Paris during the early
1950s. Hemsing was the United States Information Agency's Public Affairs Officer in
Berlin when the Berhn Wall was constructed in August 1961, and made headlines when
-
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he and U.S. Minister Allan Lightner drove a Volkswagen, with a U.S. Military escort,
past Check Point Charlie and the East Gennan border pohce without submitting theIr
passports39 The action was intended to reaffirm the rights of American officials to
enter East Berlin without recognizing East German authority. 40
Allied film policy toward Gennany during the postwar period is reflected in
numerous correspondences between military and civilian personnel involved in the
various film efforts aimed at re-educating Gerrnans.-l l Those efforts included the
structuring of Well 1m Film itself and the acceptance or rejection of various
American-made films destined for German theaters.-l2
Post-War Newsreels in East Germany
lJer Augen.:euge (The Eyewitness) began operations in East Germany In
February] 946, about the time Well 1m Film was moving into its second phase of
operations as described in Chapter I. But the series, produced by the Gennans
themselves, initially did not present rigid Soviet ideological framework as one would
envision, and instead had kind words for all. The senes initially presented images of
internal Soviet affairs endorsIng joint Allied occupation of Berlin, Allied sport
competitions, and actually depicted Allied women extolling the virtues of democracy
and praising Montgomery, Eisenhower and Mrs. Roosevelt. 43 Coverage stressing the
virtue of portraying differing points of view changed, however, in the fall of 1948, when
Der Augen=euge and Nalwnalkomitee rreles Deutschland (NKFS), a newsreels series




i'Velt 1m Film, the American and British produced newsreel series for showing to
postwar Gennan movie-goers, was at first intended to emphasize defeat and guilt
themes and democratic Idealism. But they were designed to punish, as well, so the
Gennan people were presented with harsh images of Gennan wartime failures and of
Gennans beIng executed without explanation.~5
The newsreels were intended to let the Gennans know they had been totally
defeated, to instill a sense of guilt in them, to inflict punishment, and to offer a plan to
gain "the joys and beauties ofthe Democratic way of life." ~6 The first few issues of
Welt 1m Film were compiled in London in mid-1945 before the entire operatIOn moved
in the fall of that year to Munich in the U.S. occupation zone of Gennany. After the
move to Munich, execution scenes were eliminated from the series, and the major
themes of defeat, retribution and postwar plannIng were supplemented with
International stories, making Welt 1/11 Film content more like that of newsreels shown
elsewhere in the world at the time.~7
Major changes in the way material was presented also occurred in ]947 w1th
increasing pressures of the Cold War. Prior to that time, the Soviet Union had been
portrayed as an ally of the United States, but during 1947, efforts increased In Welt 1n2
Film to dissuade Gennans from accepting Communism and socialism and to persuade
them to accept democracy and its benefits. 48 By the time the Berlin Airlift was in full
swmg in 1948, the series had become full-blown propaganda from the Western side
against the Soviet Union and Communism.~9
-
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The evolution uf Welt im Film into an anti-Communist propaganda weapon
paralleled the evolution of other media controlled by the United States. By 1948, for
example, the Voice of America, which had become the official global broadcasting
service of the United States in 1942, became distinctly anti-Communist in nature as the
perceived threat of the Soviet Union loomed in Eastern Europe.50
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The primary methodology used in this thesis is historical analysis of
correspondence that circulated among military and cIvilian officials mvolved in setting
policy for the Welt im Film newsreel series during the three eras under study. Other
documents, such as film policy gUIdelines, were used for analysis as well. Historical
narration is used to a degree to tell the story of Welt im Film within a historical context.
Robert Jones Shafer has provided the framework for the methodology used in
this thesis in his A Guide to HisLOrical Method I Shafer makes a distinction between
historical narrative and historical analysis, the two primary methods used in this theSIS:
Humanity's fascination with its past is illustrated by the great variety of
historical literature. The most useful distinction is between narrative and
analySIS, although the two frequently are combined. Narrative is story,
often with descriptIon as a simple son of near-analysIs, but sometimes
with a great deal of profound analYSIS. Analysis is examination of tOpICS,
groups of events or ideas, with only incidental attention to mdividual
occurrences. 2
Shafer notes that analysis rather than narrative is characteristic of the bulk of
scholarly production, 3 and that this could be because fewer people are capable of
writing brilliant narrative history than of turning out scholarly monographs. 4 NarratIve
at its extreme, Shafer says, contains little analysis, and analySIS at its extreme has little
narrative. Analysis requires "meticulous research into source matenals or evidence," 5
whereas narration pays attention "to story, to great events and human mterest, and to
individual heroism and depravity.... " 6 The usual vehicle for analysis is the monograph,
-
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which was refined by "scientific" historians of the 19th century into approximately its
present fonn. 7
lt (monographic study) is ... a child of science rather than of humamsm.
Although influenced by the humanist tradition, it holds to the dictum that
accuracy is more important than art. It is obvious that monographic
studies often fail to integrate results into the broader framework of
history; also, most are dull. Some monographic history, nevertheless, is
well written., even lively, and some carefully integrates the analysis into
history in general. 8
Historical Method Applied to Jf'elt im Film
Issues and Documents
The historical analysis and narrative methods are used in thIS thesis to tell the
story of Welt im Film and of events and significant developments leading up to its
production. Descriptions offilm efforts that preceded the series are part of this story, as
are the actual production, the philosophies that guided the production, and the reactions
to the production. This narrative method is combined analysis as described by Shafer.
Narrative Method
The narrative method is used in this thesis to ensure readability among
non-historians in an effort to increase the reading audience and to provide what Shafer
referred to as "a communication lmk between the scholar and the pub] ie." Y Welt 1m
Film is presented herein as a story of psychological warfare, of re-education, and of
anti-communist propaganda. lt is presented in the context of historical development of
film and., specifically, of documentary film and newsreels. It is a story that began when
pictures first moved in the 1880s, and one that continues through the devastation and
rebuilding of the 19405 and into the early 19505.
--
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Historical Method: Science or Humanity?
The approach to Weir 1m Ftlm in this thesIs is to treat hIstory more as a humanity
than as a science. A purely scientific approach cannot adequately deal with the
functions of people, because intellectual and spiritual forces cannot be subj ected to any
analysis that can properly be called scientific. Personal philosophies and values of the
author of this thesis tended to be a motivational factor In its development. Personal
attitudes toward Hitler and the Third Reich, in propaganda in general and toward
attempts to mold people's attitudes, in film and its influence on audiences, and of
censorship and restriction of material, all played a role in the development of this
thesis.
Continuity of History
The idea of continuity of history and of presenting Welt im Ftlm in historical
perspective also played a role in development of this thesis. The story of Welt 1m Ftlm
could not have been told without presenting the story of film documentaries that
preceded the series and without inclusion of prevailing philosophies among AllIed
officials, both those involved in film policy and those Involved in general policy toward
occupied Germany.
Research Questions and Causation: The "Why?"
The basic research questions as described in the Introduction section of this
thesis are: What was the extent of the Allied propaganda and censorship policy in the
newsreel series Well im Film in the various eras in the context of overall film policy
toward postwar Germany? How was that policy carried oue
-
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Causation, or why Welt 1m Film occurred in its various forms, is also part of the
story. What caused Well im Film to take on the psychological warfare form of the early
days, and then to evolve into an era of re-education and information, and then to
eventually evolve into a full-blown anti-communist propaganda mediwn for the British
and the United States? And why were the various prevailing themes important to those
producing the series? What was the purpose of emphasizing these themes in the context
of overall Allied policy? This thesIs attempts to answer these questions while telling the
story of Welt im Film.
Elements of Method
Following Shafer's model, this thesis was developed on certain elements of
method. The first, deciding on categories of evidence, was used in the chronological
classification of documents pertaining to the various eras under study, as well as sorting
in tenns of prevailing themes and various philosophies driving the production of Well
1m Film. The second, collection of evidence, was accomplished through two means;
primary collection of documents and ofactual Welt im Film samples at the National
Archives in College Park, Maryland, and collection of secondary source material as
listed in the Review of the Literature section of this thesis. Much of the material used
for this thesis, therefore, is that which was produced by actual witnesses and
participants of the events described, along with the accounts of historians living or




Analysis of Welt im Film
And Welt im Film Documents
The major source of materials for analysis was documents related to Well im
FJlm, which consisted of correspondences between mi litary fi 1m officials and
guidelines developed by the various officials and committees. These correspondences
and documents were obtained from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland.
Sample issues of Well 1m Film, also obtained from the National Archives in College
Park, \vere al so used for analysIs.
When a researcher makes a note on the copy of a document he or she has
obtained, that note represents a degree of analysis. The note may simply say "relates to
timeliness," or '"Psychological Warfare era." If the note goes beyond mere copying of
the document, even to the slightest degree, then it becomes analysis. 24 ThiS author first
divided material related to Well im Film into several categories according to time period
and according to the various issues and elements to be explored within those time
periods. The three time periods of Well 1m Film are: (I) PsychologIcal Warfare,
May-August 1945; (2) Informational, August 1945 to July 1946; and (3)
Anti-Communist Propaganda, July 1947 to June 1952. The first chore for this author
was to divide the material chronologically so that each document (film guidelines,
letters, etc.) fit Into one of the eras listed above. Within the actual time penods, cel1am
themes dominated, and documents were further divided according to those themes.
Analysis of Prevailing Themes
Within Each Era
Analysis consisted of investigatIOn of overall film policy during the various eras
of Well im Film, along with film policy specifically designed for the series. In addition,
-
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specific application of film pollcy as it related to acti.illi themes \vlthin e£1ch er£1 \-Vol:;
probed.
For example, In the "Psychological Warfare" era of the senes, it became clear
that prevai Iing themes were guilt and punishment, the destruction the war had caused,
the defeat of Gennany's allies, and the victorious Allies returning horne. An analysIs of
issue No. 13, which was near the end of the era, and related documents illustrates these
themes.
Issue No. 82, released near the end of 1946 as an overview of that year. along
with related documents, was used for analysis of the "Informational'" era of l'Vell lin
Film. Prevailing themes during this era, as indicated by Issue No. 82 and related
documents, included food and clothing distribution as "goodwill" efforts, economic
recovery of Germany, examples of democracy at work, Allied unity, and reconstruction
of the devastated country. Noticeably absent from this era are references in Well 1m
Film and in correspondence and policy documents to alleged failures of the Soviet
Union and Communism in these areas.
Finally, Well 1m him issues ofmld-1947 and beyond, during the Berlm AIr/itt
and the Welt 1m Film era of "Anti-Communist Propaganda" of the series, along with
related documents that pertain to driving policy and philosophy, are also examined and
analyzed. Generally during this era, film policy officials maintained major AllIed
success themes of the prevIOus era, but incorporated the added ingredient of failures of
the Communist In their own redevelopment efforts.
-
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To fully appreciate the philosophical motivation of those responsible for ~Velt /In
Film content and production during the vanous periods under study, it is necessary to
review the history of documentaries, especially those related to war, and to consIder
overall U.S. film policy toward Germany during the postv.:ar period. Persuasion
techniques developed during World War I by such people as George Creel likely had a
influence on later persuasion efforts such as Frank Capra's Why We Fight series of
World War II, which in turn, had an indirect impact on such projects as Weir 1m Film.
And although the pnmary intent of rigorous World War II film polIcy was to prohibit
the showing of feature films deemed undesirable by the occupational forces, the policy
greatly Influenced the content of documentanes and newsreels as well
IYeit 1111 FJlm confonned to overall film polley by following stnct guidelines
established by various committees and officials. Only material approved at the highest
level of lnfonnation Control, U.S. Army, was incorporated into the senes. Censorship
and film review procedures were spelled out in detail by military film authorItIes, and
each film, whether feature, documentary or newsreel, was required to go through an
elaborate process before it could be released to the movie theaters I
The first issue of Well im Film was released on 18 May 1945, Just ten days after
the end of hostilltles. More than 200 weekly Issues followed before the endmg of its
compulsory status at the creation of the Bundesrepublik in September 1949. The
-
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newsreel continued under joint Anglo-American operation until 1 June 1950, when the
British withdrew from the program, and under the operation of the Amencans alone
until 27 June 1952, when production ceased altogether with issue 369. 2
In the first era of Welt 1m Film, from May 1945 to August \945, major themes
were guilt and punishment, which included images of Gennans being executed and also
of the devastatIon of Germany as a result of the war. These early Issues, developed by
the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme European Allied Command, extolled
the VIrtues of democracy only to a limited degree, for It is clear that those In charge of
Welt im Film were most interested in continuing to wage psychological warfare against
the German people as they had done before the war had ended. l
SometIme in August 1945, it became apparent to military fi 1m policy makers
that waging psychological warfare against the Germans was of little value,.! since the
United States was no longer at war with Germany. Because the Psychological Warfare
Division had been in charge ofwa!:,ring such war against the Germans during actual
hostilities, their dutIes had sImply carried over Into the poshvar period if only for a few
months.
Major themes from top officials dunng the second era of {-Velt 1m Film, after
control of the series had been transferred from the Psychological Warfare Division to
the Information Services Control sections of the Office of Mi Iitary Government,
emphasized the various elements according to the prevailing philosophy. Food
distribution, economIC development, normalization of German life, the virtues of




By mid-1947, when Welt rm him officials realized that newsreels and
documentaries being produced by the Russians for showmg in East Gennany were
becoming Communist propaganda endeavors, emphasis for the Well 1m Film series
shifted to anti-Communist propaganda, and newsreels and documentaries on both sides
of the Iron Curtain served as propaganda tools for theIr respective sides for the
remainder of the decade and into the 19505. This era, from mld-1947 to 1952. the
"Anti-Communist Propaganda" period, is the third era of rVelt 1m Film under study.
Early Film Efforts
Although the value of propaganda in film was recObYJllzed when pictures first
moved, the defining moment in history for the development of film propaganda came
Just before and during World War I, when various countnes produced propaganda films
to gain popular support for their war effons.~ [t was the cinema's ability to reach mass
audIences that made it attractive to vanous officials In the battle for the hearts and
minds of ordinary people.!>
But the results of film propaganda efforts during World War l are uncenam
Despite thIS uncertainty, there ~merged in the years to follow a belief among
communicators that film had an enormous power as a propaganda tool This belIef gave
rise to the "magic bullet" and "hypodermic needle" communication theories, which not
only attested to the belief of the power of film as propaganda, but also created an image
of a receiving public that was more or less powerless to deflect the messages sent to
them or to discem between what was true and what was noe
During the years between World War I and World War II, propagandists were
motivated by these beliefs. By the time hostilities had broken out at the beginning of
-
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World War II, film propaganda had become an art form, and BrItish, American, German
and Russian efforts began to make an indelible mark on film history and on society as a
whole. s
Early U.S. Efforts
When war broke out in Europe in 1914, the population of the United States was
split on whether the country should remain out of the conflict at all costs or prepare for
entrance into the war which many said was inevitable. l) At first, many feature films
were aimed at convincing the population that the nation should remain neutral and
avoid war, but when it became apparent in early-1917 that entry into the war was
unavoidable, an effort was initiated to reduce pacifist feelings. lO George Creel, chief of
the Committee on Public Information (the official U.S. agency for domestic
propaganda) began using motion pictures as part of an all-out campaign to sell the war
to the American public [) After the war was over, Creel presented a principle that
would guide future programs aimed at gaining public support for war efforts. [n his
book How We Advertised America, written shortly after the end of the war, Creel said
.. The war was not fought in France alone. Back of the firing-line, back
of armies and navies, back of the great supply-depots, another struggle
waged with the same intensity and with almost equal significance
attaching to its victories and defeats. It was the fight for the mind,
(Creel's own italics) of men, for the "conquest of their convictions," and
the battle-line ran through every home in every country. 12
Later, in 1933, Harold Lasswell, the renowned communicator, would reiterate
Creel's theme, and it would become the guiding light for all U.S. war persuasion
endeavors. Lasswell said, -'No government could hope to Win without a united nation
-
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behind it, and no government could have a united nation behind it unless it controlled
the mmds of the people.... " J.\
Early British Efforts
The British government launched an intensive film propaganda effort at the end
of 1915 with the release of Britain Prepared, which was designed to demonstrate to the
British people the country's preparedness for war. 14 The release of Britain Prepared
was followed by some 27 short films depicting non-combat wartime efforts at the
fron1. 15 Technical limitations and scrutiny by British intelligence officers generally
excluded actual combat footage in these films.
That changed with the release of The Hallie a/the Somme in August 1916. The
film's actual battle scenes depicted wounded and dead British soldiers. 16 Well receIved
by the British public, the film was conSidered a success in both a busmess sense and a
patriotic-rallying sense. The film, 77 minutes in length, is not considered by many as a
true propaganda effort, since it presented actual images of the British Fourth Army
north of the River Somme in the days immedIately before, during and after the start or
the Sommt: otlenslYe in a completely factual manner. 17
The hIgh point of wartime official film propaganda for the British came dunng a
penod between October 1916 and January 1917. In October 1916, the British released
the film The King Visits HIS Armies In the Grea! Advance, and in January 1917, {he
Balfle o(the Ancre and the Advance ofthe Tanks was reJeased. ,g Thus ended the first
full year of British propaganda film production, an effort that was seen as a complete
success at the tIme.
--
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But questions remain as to how successful these films were in persuading people
to support the war effort. The films were produced In a favorable climate, and
audiences may have been receptive to theIr message simply because they were already
in agreement with the war effort. It is likely that the official films played very linle, If
any, part In persuading the British public to support the war, and in this particular case,
it would appear that the power of film propaganda was more mythical than real. IY
Early Russian Efforts
In Russian, film propaganda also came of age during the period of World War I,
which coincided with the Russian Revolution of 1917. The first effort by Russian
authorities to use the cinema for propaganda purposes came in March 1914, when the
Skobelev Committee, which had been establ ished earlier to assist veterans of the
Russo-Japanese War, set up the Military Film Section. The agency was given the
exclusive right to fi 1m at the front when war broke out in August of that year, but that
right was revoked when commercIal press agencies complained about the quality and
scarcity of its films. 20 Although this represented a delay in the development of a
government monopoly of film, by 19 I6, efforts were under way to establIsh a
government film monopoly. The Russian Revolution of 1917, however, halted these
efforts, and despne its enonnous potentIal, the cinema remained unharnessed by the
Provisional Government. 21
The Skobelev Comminee was reorganized on several occasions, and in June
1917, began producing a propaganda newsreel called Free RUSSia. The Provisional
Government had already abolished censorship simply to relieve itself of an unnecessary
administrative burden. The result was an increase in commercial films about the fallen
-
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imperial family. And although steps were being taken immediately after the October
Revolution m 1917 to secure control of mformatlon, it would be several years before
governmental film propaganda and censorship fully blossomed in Russia. Z2
Following the revolutIOn, Russian leaders set up the Department of Agitation
and Propaganda in Moscow, which took complete control of all information media.
WithIn a short time, all forms of printing -- books, newspapers, pamphlets, and posters
-- were controlled by the State Publicity Corporation. 23 The Main Political Education
Committee of the Republic was established in 1920, and immediately took on the task
of educating the masses through radio and the cinema. The Communists then began to
develop documentary films with strong elements of persuasion.2~
Early German Efforts
The origins and development of German film up to the First World War, whIch
broke out in 1914, reflect a pattern similar to most European countries. 25 The First
World War put the German cinema on its feet. But propaganda efforts by the Germans
during the war never matched British efforts, and many Germans, including Adolf
Hitler himself, later attributed the Joss of the war to superior propaganda techmques of
the British. 2b Hitler was so impressed with what he called the "gem us" of Bntish
propaganda that he paId tribute to the British effort in his book Mem Kampf27
Propaganda efforts by the Germans prior to the war were amateunsh, at best,
and Jacked both organization and moral drive. 28 During the early months of the war,
films with patriotic themes prevailed and were well receIved by German audiences, but
as the German advance was slowed by opposing forces, exhilaration began to evaporate,
and Germans began seeking an escape from the realities of the war. The result was a
-
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shift away from movies with patriotic themes to movies produced for pure escapist
entertainment value?'
During the war, all films shown in Gennany were subjected to censorship by the
military. In July 1915, the government prohibited the export offilms in an effort save
materials, and in February 19] 6, it banned imports to save foreign currency and to
prevent the infiltration ofenerny propaganda. Fmally, in January 1917, it began
censorship of films for export to Allied and neutral countries in an effort to control the
image of Gennany outside its borders. .w
In December 1917, the Umversum-Film-Aktiengese//sclwf/, or Ufu, was fanned.
{[fa came too late to act as an effective wartime propaganda agency. but It eventually
exerted a fundamental influence on the subsequent development of the German cinema
in the period following the war. 3 ! In ]918, during the chaotic days following the war,
artistiC expressIOn in film and In other media became fragmented. and few clear
patterns emerged. 32
[n 1919, Das Cubmel Des Dr. Callgan ([he Cabmef ofDr. ('a/waTl) was
released. and immediately became a sensationH The film would eventually epitomize
the period by presenting images of "insane" and "unlimited authority"' against the
common man, V\~th reason ultimately overpowering unreasonable power. The film
reflected a double aspect of Gennan life, coupling a reality in which Caligari's
authority tri umphs with a hall ucination in which the same authority is overthrown.·14
German films In the 19205, dunng the early years of the Weimar Republic, are
distinguished by an apparent obsession with the nature and exercise of power. Most of
them seemed preoccupIed with the grotesque, the tortured and the abnonnal. FJlms of
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the era can be roughly divided into two categories; those that were not directly political
and those that were openly political. Those that were political In nature dealt with such
themes as the restoration of the monarchy (Fndencus Rex, for example).35
One of the last films made dunng the Weimar Republic era was The Tesrament
ofDr. Mabu'ie, which allowed the film director, Fritz Lang, the opportunity to interject
veiled comments on Nazism. In a program note on the film's Amencan premIere, Lang
wrote:
This film was made as an allegory to show Hitler's processes of
terrorism. Slogans and doctrines of the Third Reich have been put into
the mouths of criminals in the film. Thus I hoped to expose the masked
Nazi theory of the necessity to deliberately destroy everything which is
precious to a people ... Then, when everything collapsed and they were
thrown into utter despair, they would try to find help in the 'new order.'
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During the 1930s, Nazj propaganda began to dominate the German cinema.
Perhaps the most striking example of Nazi propaganda in film is Triumph ofthe Will,
directed by Leni Riefenstahl. The movie portrays a huge Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg
in 1934, and although not considered a typical Nazi propaganda film, it IS considered a
masterpiece of film propaganda. 3?
In VIewing the film, it IS easy to understand the profound impact it would later
have on American fi 1m maker Frank Capra when he began work on the Why We Fight
senes of World War II. (See U.S. Film Pohcy During 1942-45 below). The film
captured the essence of the Nazi movement, and adequately projected the awesome
power that \\'as about to be unleashed upon the world. In 1935, Riefenstahl published a




the Reich Party Rally Film, in which she praises Hitler for his insight into the
Importance of film.
The fuhrer has recognized the importance of film. Where else In the
world has the opportunity for developing the film in its abundance of
expression into the interpreter of an event been so perspicaciously
recognized') Once again Adolf Hitler has given an unprecedented
example ... In the world we have seen documentary films; governments
have had them made and parties have ordered campaign films. The helief
that a real and strong experience (Jia natIOn canfmd new expenence in
the film was born in Germany. In this way the Fuhrer has given the
contemporary film both its sense and mission.J~
In the film, Rudolf Hess, number two in command in Hitler's Germany, speaks
to the masses gathered to show homage to the Fuhrer Hess touches upon most of the
themes that arc central to the overall message of the film, those of leadership, loyalty,
UnIty, strength and Gennanness.
My Fuhrer, around you are gathered the flags and banners of this
National Socialism. Only when their cloth has worn thin .\vill people,
looking back, be able to understand fully the greatness of our time and
conceive what you, my fuhrer, mean for Germany. You are Germany.
When you act. the nation acts. When you Judge, the people judge. Our
gratitude is our pledge to stand by you for better or for worse, come what
may' Thanks to your leadership, Germany will achieve her goal of bemg
a homeland. a homeland for all the Germans In the world. You were our
guarantee of victory: You are now our guarantee of peace. Heil Hitler'
Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil' Sieg HeilJ~
Triumph ofthe Will almost presents Hitler as a deity -- a man larger than life, a
man who is portrayed as Germany itself, who does not offer hope, but is hope itself





Before television, the largest group of conswners of vIsual media w~re
movie-goers. Prior to 1952, before television had gained its widespread "non-elite"
audience, some 64 million Americans received a dose of "teel good" patriotism each
week ifl the fonn of a newsree1.~o In 1952, during the heyday of newsreels, the major
companies producing newsreels in the United States were Paramount New.... Fox
l'vlovletone News. Warner-flu/he NeYI"s, Univena/ New,\, and New.\' o{lhe /)ay
(MetTo-Goldwyn-Mayer-Hearst). British companies, many of which were subsidiaries
of American companies, included Hnllsh MovJ(!lone News, Brilish jJowmount New.\',
Palhe News, (jaummont f3ritlsh News, and {Iniversu/ News. 41
The first film ever, made in 1895 by the Lumiere brothers of France, was lA'
sorlie des usme.\' I,umrere, a /'yon-MontpLaisrr (workmen leaving the Lumiere factory at
Lyon-Montplaisir), was a newsreel in a very real way. It was followed by others, all a
short view of real life situations.-l2
From these beginnings, the step to filming official visits, catastrophes and o(h~r
events was a short one. By 1896, the Lumiere brothers engaged Felix Mesguich, who
was to become the world's first film reporter. Mesguich began traveling allover
Europe and other pans of the world filming various evenlS and catastrophes. 11
Film reporting as initiated by the Lumiere brothers and carried out by Mesguich
appeared at about the same time as photographIC press reporting. In 1907 in Germany,
the Deulsche Warle published the first photograph ever to appear in a daily newspaper.
But some years earlier, in 1892, the Rerlmer IIfustnerte Z<,ifung, not officially
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considered a newspaper, published a photographic report on the Bromberg railway
acci dent.+l
The modern newsreel was born in 1905 in the United States, and around 1907 In
France, and followed the establishment of permanent halls for film showing. The
creatiOn of these halls meant that most of those viewing movies were the same people
over and over again, necessitating the need to change newsreel material frequently. 45
World War I, the period from 1914 to 1918, gave the newsreels a chance to
assert themselves and to produce footage of some of the great happenings in the
world.-l6 Dunng this period, the American films finally moved ahead of others in
quality and became the production leaders, a position they held throughout the
remainIng history of the newsreels. With a few exceptIons around the world, newsreels
became a thing of the past when television took over in the early 1950s as the primary
medium for the mass audiences of the tlIne.-l7
u.s. Film Policy During 1942-45
Policy established during the early years of World War 11 would continue to
Influence production and distribution of all film for German consumption after the war
and throughout the decade. In 1942, Frank Capra, an Academy Award winmng film
director of the time, was charged with producing films designed to inform the public
and to encourage participation in the war effort.-l8 The endeavor was destined to be in
the true spirit of the "winning the hearts and minds of men" concept establ ished by
Creel some two decades before.-l~
-
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The Whl' We Fi~ht Series
Like most major film propaganda efforts, the campaign by the United States had
become very sophisticated by the time World War 11 began. Capra was inducted into the
Anny in June 1942 and was Immediately made chIef of the Film Production Section of
Special Services for the purpose of producing the Wh.v We Fight series5fJ Chief of Staff
Gen. George C. Marshall had ordered the induction and placement of Capra after the
general found that lectures presented to newly inducted servicemen lacked in
effectiveness. Shortly after Capra's induction, Marshall and Capra met, and Capra
promised to make him "the best damned documentary films ever made." 51
Wlthm a few weeks of that promise, the filmmaker viewed Leni Riefenstahl's
7humph ofthe Will, which Capra saw as "an ominous prelude of Hitler's holocaust of
hate," made in such a way that "Satan couldn't have devised a more blood-chilling
super-spectacle." 5~
Driven by the enormity of the project and the impression that Triumph oj" the
Will had had on him, Capra immediately began work, and hetween 1942 and 194),
produced a series of seven films, Prelude! (0 War, 717(' l\/a~/,\ .......(rlke, D,Vide (J/ll)
('onquer. The Baffle o(Bntam. The Hartle ojRussia. 7hc Hallie (~!"( 'I1IIW and War
<. 'omes to Amerlca.~'
Two basic assumptions appeared to underlie the preparation of the films. The
first was that a sizable segment of the draftee population lacked knowledge of the
natIonal and international events leading up to America's entrance into the war, and the
second was that a knowledge of those events would in some way lead men to accept
induction into the Anny more willingly q
--
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Marshall opened the first film of the series, Prelude to War, first shown to
troops on 30 October 1942, with the following summary of the objectives for the new
senes:
This film, the first of a series, has been prepared by the War Department
to acquaint members of the Army with factual information as to the
causes, the events leading up to our entry into the war, and to the
principles for which we are fighting. A knowledge of these facts is an
indispensable part of military trai ni ng and merits the thoughtful
consideration of every American soldier. 55
The films won critical acclaim, and Prelude 10 War received an Academy
Award for best documentary film of 1942. 56 Some, however, criticized the film for
"overgeneralization," and others spoke of Prelude 10 War references to "Mr. John Q.
Public" as a betrayal of an "underestimation of the audience." 57
Subsequent research has shown that the series actually changed few opinions
and attitudes, however. The films appear to have had no effect on men's general
motivation to serve as soldiers, which had at the outset been the ultimate objective of
the orientatIon program. 58
The True Glory
the true (;/ory,5Y which won its own Oscar for the best documentary of J945, ()O
was the last great combat documentary of World War II. The film was introduced by
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and told the story
of the last year of the war in Europe, beginning with the Normandy invasion and ending
with the fall of Berlin. 61 The film was considered a success In an artistic and popular
sense, but a fai Iure in tenns of its original purposes.
---
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The first attempt at making ajoint Anglo-American film took place in 1943-44,
when Capra was sent to London to co-produce a joint-effort documentary on the North
African campaign by the Allies. But what was suppos~d to be a cooperative effort
developed into a major crisis in inter-Allied propaganda between Capra and the British
Army Film Unit because of difference in personality and film-making techniques. A
positive receptIon of the film J"umslUn Victory, released in early 1944, In no way
calmed tensions that had built up between U.S. and British film makers.·62
In response to these tenSIOns, Allied officIals established the JOint
Anglo-American Film Planning Committee (JAAFPC) In March 1944 for the purpose of
cinematic coverage of the coming invasIOn of France Joint planning between the
United States and Britain was to be driven by two important goals -- to present the
appearance of Allied lU1ity to the world and to boost soldier moral. But JAAFPe also
become bogged down in mter-service and inter-Allied rivalry that symbolized much of
Anglo-American relations during the last year and a halfofthe war. (,I As a result.
neither of these major goals were achieved. The world saw disunity rather than unity
between the Allies, and separate efforts by Britain tended to emphasize its role In the
war over the role of other Allied nations (>-I
Robert Riskin, ChIef of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War lnfonnation' s
Motion Picture Bureau, emphasizing the effect of this rift on the morale of the
American soldier, said on 31 March 1944 in a letter to Gen. Robert A. McClure, chief
of Publicity and Political Warfare, SHAEF, that an American soldier serving in the
United Kingdom, "seemg a newsreel tn which the British are WInning the war
single-handedly, is ready to start a brawl with every English soldier he meets," 65
-
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the True (;101)' was released to audiences in Britain and the United States in
August 1945 and received critical acclaim on both sides of the Atlantic. ()() But If the
film was a success in artistic terms, it was a fai lure In others. It failed to achieve the
primary goals that were established when JAAfPC was first formed: to show unity
between Allied nations and to provide a morale boost to soldIers fighting the
Germans. 67
The rift between British and American producers dunng the making of The True
Glory was never fully mended, and it would later Influence decIsions surroundIng the
productIon of the Well 1m Film newsreel series. Efforts to 100tiate a newsreel produced
jointly by the four powers that occupied Germany following World War 11 would fail,
partly because of that rift and the mIstrust that had developed between British and
American film makers. However, a larger, much more significant rift between the
occupyIng forces of the West and the Soviet Union would have a much greater Impact
on Well 1m Film and the duection It would take.
Psychological warfare techniques used dunng the last year of the Third Reich
were aimed at convincing the Germans that Germany had already lost the war and that
continuing to wage war with the Allies would be national suicide. Efforts were also
made via Voice of America radio broadcasts and leaflet drops on Germany to dIscredit
Nazi leadership and to break down the German habit of obedience to the NaziS. The
techniques used during actual hostilities were later used in postwar film efforts,
including Well im Film. 68
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(l.S. Film Policy After \Vorld \Var II
Shortly after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the Allied occupatlOn forces
began exerting total control over the operations of movie theaters in Germany and the
material that would be presented in those theaters. Licenses were Issued for operation,
and any theater that strayed even slightly from the stnct rules estabhshed by the military
command would face stem warnmgs and even closure.
]n January 1946, for example, the Information Control DIvision of the US
Army admonished the mayor of PlattJmg, Lower Bavaria for Instructing the manager of
a local theater to allow only those over 18 into the theater. The mayor was warned that
a "report to headquarters" would be forthcoming ifany further problems· developed 10
this area It is the explicit desire of the local American authorities that every youth
should have the opportUnity to view these American fil ms." 09
Other concerns were expressed 10 a Weekly Report to the director or the
Information Control Division, U.s. Army, dated 26 Januar)' 1946, from Lt. Col. Irv10g
Dilliard. chief of the Office of Military Government Bavana. Dil1Jard mentIOns the
situation with the Plattling mayor described preVIOusly, but also expresses concern that
the mayor of Klingenberg was engaged in the screening of German pictures for
censorship reasons, and that he was inviting German friends to the screemngs. He also
expressed concern that In Landsberg, the headmaster of a local school was prohibiting
children from visiting the local movie house, and those who disobeyed were beaten up
ITI school 711
The films allowed mto Germany from Amenca were closely screened by
mJiitary authorities Gen. Robert A McClure, ITI a memorandum to the Film, Theater
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and Music Control Section of the U.S. Information Control Service, ordered the
American film The Maltese Fa/con withdrawn from circulation in German theaters
because the film "... simply perpetuates the Goebbles (sic) Chicago gangster
propaganda line." In the same memo, McClure expressed "my complete lack of
confidence in the New York Review Board's judgment," and ordered that films would
henceforth be accepted only after they had passed review by his office or by the Film,
Theater and Music Control Section. The New York Review Board had been set up by
civilian authorities in the United States to review film destined to Germany, and this
memo, in effect, revoked the authority of that board to decide what films would be
allowed for showing in Germany. 71
The screening process for feature films considered for German audiences was a
complicated one, and it entailed the participation of a German for the purpose of
ascertaining political implications of films that might go undetected by a non-Germans.
The actual screening of German motion pIcture film is to be carried out
by the Film Censorship Officer and one member of the "Kammer der
Kunstschaffenden" (Chamber of Creative Artists)
The Film Censorship Officer, after screening a film, will make his
comments on the Screening Report Form (sample attached). He will also
make his recommendations as to the classification of such screened film.
The member of the Chamber of Creative Artists who attended such
screening will submit his comments as to the advisability of showing
such film to the German public from a political point of view, and as to
any knowledge he may posses about anyone person actively engaged in
the making of such picture, in writing. His comment will be attached to
the Screening Report Form. 72
After screening, motion pictures were placed into one of three classification
groups. Category A films were those that had received unanimous recommendation a.<.;
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suitable for showing to German civilian audiences. Category B films had been
unanimously recommended as suitable, but with certam conditions such as deletions of
credit titles or minor cuts or alterations. Category C films were deemed unsuitable for
showing to German audiences71
Among other films recommended for \\i;thdrawal from German theaters in early
1946 because they "might evoke unfavorable criticism of the American way of IIfe'-
were ActIOn in the North AtlaJ1llc. Corvette K-225. Wrng and a Prayer. Fighting IJae/v.
DestrnatlOn Tokyo, Thirty Second\· Over Tokyo, Topper Heturns, Magic In MUSIC, and
So Proudly We Hal!. 7.. Films approved for shOWIng to German audiences Included Snow
White, Madame Curie, J Married a Witch, Our Tuwn, Across the PaCific and }J"de and
PreJudice. 7) Concerns had earlier been expressed over sho\\iing of [he (irapcs ofWrath
and The Grear Dictator,76 although there IS no indication that those films were actually
withdrawn or kept out of Gennan circulatIOn.
The Information Control Division of the U.S. Army had set firm policy In thIS
area on 28 September 1945, some seven months before the withdrawal of the Maltese
Falcon. Guidelines established by that dIvision In December 1945 ordered the Film,
Theater and Music Control Section to reject those films that
I. Glorify ideology of FaSCIsm, Nazism and raCial distinctIon.
2. Glorify or idealize war or militarism.
3. Politically subvert or pervert German hiStory.
4. Glorify or idealize the German Army
5. Ridicule, or seem derogatory or uncomplimentary of Allied peoples, their
governments, their political or national leaders.
--
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6. Deal with German revenge.
7. Ridicule or criticize the religious feelings and religious attitudes of others.
8. Glorify or idealize the thoughts and/or acts of German leaders whose opinions
or actions or political philosophy was imperialistic at the expense of the allies.
9. Originate in a book or script of a known Nazi Party member or supporter.
10. Originate through the creative efforts of known Nazi Party members or
proven active supporters. Those whose creative effort contribute to the making of a
picture shall be: producer, director, production chief, author, scenario \VTiter, actors and
actresses, composer, musical score adapter and film editor. 77
Those policies were essentially updated and established as the "PrinCiples for
Inter-Allied Censorship ofGerman Films" in May 1946. Most of the guidelines
remamed the same, except that No. 10 also excluded films whose participants were
"under prosecution by the Allied Occupation Authorities." 7R
Film policy for occupied Germany was firmly in place by the time the Marshall
Plan took effect in June 1947. The Welt im Film series was initiated in May 1945, and
although the fi rst issues of the series were crude and or dubious val ue in the
"re-education" of the Germans, the effort matured significantly in the latter part of 1945
and into 1946, and generally followed a path consistent with overall policy throughout
the decade.
When the war ended, efforts began immediately to re-educate the Germans
toward democracy and to make them realize the errors of their past and the anguish and
turmoil they had unleashed upon the world. But in retrospect, few see any successes In
this endeavor. 7'1
If early postwar film policy was failure, and whether it succeeded or failed
remains in dispute, perhaps it was due to an arrogant assumption on the part of the
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Allies that one culture is capable ofre-educating another, especially when those being
"re-educated" were more concerned with feeding and protecting themselves than with
ideological embellishment. Hans Habe, author of OffIimits: A Novel a/Occupied
Germany and All My Sins: An Autobiography, puts it this way: "The idea that a nation
should look back, questioning and repenting, was the concept of a conqueror.... The
people only worried about how to fill their stomachs and their stoves."80
But the prevailing attitude among Allied commanders, driven by a statement by
President Roosevelt a year before the end of hostilities in Europe, was that the Gennans
must be punished for what they had done. They must be reminded over and over that
their activities were an affront to the civilized world. In September 1944, Roosevelt had
stated:
Too many people here (in the United States) and in England hold the
view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has
taken place -- that only a few Nazis are responsible. That unfortunately is
not based on fact. The German people as a whole must have it driven
home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless
conspiracy against the decencies of modem civilizationH'
As a result of this attitude among U.S officials, the Gennans were given
mandatory doses of defeat and guilt themes in such film projects as Welt im Film. The
idea was to punish the Gennans by presenting harsh images of destruction wrought by
the Allies but instigated by the Germans themselves. As we shall see, those harsh
images included the execution of Gennans, and to German viewers, they were being
executed simply because they were German.
The Marshall Plan's European film unit produced numerous documentaries
during the period from 1948 to 1955. Albert Hemsing, a chief architect in that effort,
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describes the chief goals of the unit, includmg one of "Anti-Communist Cold War
rropaganda."~" Welt im Film, as we will see later, fit snugly mto this pattern during the
late] 940s. It would be a pattern that would dominate all film endeavors by the Allies
during the closmg years of the decade.
Welt im Film: The "Psychological Warfare" Era,
May-August 1945
Near the end of Apnl ]945, in the waning days of the Third Reich, Adolf Hitler,
his new wife, Eva Braun, and others who remained close to him until the end huddled
together in a Berlin bunker, worrying collectively about the advancing Russians and
what they would do to them If they found them alive. 83 At a time when bloody battles
were still being waged in the Pacific, a team working for the Psychological Warfare
DivisIOn of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was preparing
for the first releases of Welt 1m Film. &.J Planning for the senes had begun in London
earlier in the year. 85 As early as February] 945, some three months before the cessation
of hostilities, reports describmg the newsreel effort circulated among those responsible
for its implementation. One such report, issued on ]5 February 1945, referred to the
need for screening of dummy reels and the test-recording of potential commentators. Kl'
With the Psychological Warfare Division ofSHAEF working on the project, It was
apparent that the tone of the series, at least that of the early Issues. would reflect "the
harshest interpretatIOns ofoccupatlOn policy,'" &7 driven by the Allied desire to dnve
home defeat and guilt themes and to punish the Germans for the destruction they had
WTOUght upon the world. And indeed, the tone was harsh. The first ten Issues were filled
with scenes of German citIes devastated by Allied bombing, the defeat of Germany's
--
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allies in Europe and Asia, and, perhaps most startling, executions of Germans without
explanation, or with the simple reason that those being executed were "spies and
saboteurs." gg The first issue, released on 18 May 1945, included, among other items,
scenes of the ruins of German cities, of Gennan ex-prisoners of war returning home, of
looting in Germany, and of the execution ofa German spy.!N
But Gennan audiences did not see "spies and saboteurs" being executed. They
only saw Germans being executed, and to those audiences, people were being executed
simply because they were German. 90 The purpose of such execution portrayals was
likely twofold. One, it had been decided early in the development of the senes that
Germans would be made to feel collective guilt their World War II atrocities. Second.
those creating the series, in line with overall policy, 5aW the need to limit resistance to
the occupation of their country by Allied troops, and frightening them into submission
was apparently the tactic seen as most desirable.
Negative audience reaction from German movie-goers as well as from Gennan
POWs heing held in Britain, however, caused ~Velf im FJ/m producers to rethink that
position, and execution scenes were dropped after the first 10 issues. Later, during the
second era of Weft im Film, excluding footage of public executions became a matter of
policy, although some execution scenes sJjpped by first-line censors. In July 1946, an
officer of the InformatIOn Control Division expressed disappointment to Well 1m FI1m
producers at issue No. 59 in general. But he especially took offense to an execution
scene, and ordered it removed from the issue:
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The second Item, the death of Frank in Prague, contains entirely too
sketchy a summary of the reasons for his execution. It shows the now
familiar figure In profile of a man receiving sentence of death without
flinching and mIght readily lead the audience to feel that the man met his
death like a hero. We and the British are opposed to public executions
and in our eyes the sight of the man after hanging IS obJectionable.
Under the circumstances Instructions have been issued to Berhn and are
now being issued to both U.S and British Zones to remove this number
from the reel. At best the subject was a bit 0ld 91
The imttallssues of Welt im Film were designed to let the Germans know that
they had been totally defeated, to instill a sense of guilt by presenting Images of the
atrocities committed by their country, to inflict punishment, and to offer a plan through
which they might realize the benefits of democracy. Early emphasis was on guilt,
however, and bombed out German cities were seen in every issue, along with scenes
from the concentration camps. The entire fifth issue of the series was dedicated to the
most horrifying images of those death camps. 92
The "Psychological Warfare" era of Welt 1m Film, while emphasizing the
punishment aspect of that design, was driven by broader policy elements detailed in an
agreement between President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, pnme minIster of Great
Britain, during conferences In Quebec In 1944. Those elements decided uron at the
Quebec conference were demilitanzation, denazificatIon, deindustrialization, collective
guilt, and nonfratemization of occupying troops with German citizens.'!l
None of these policy elements would be successful for a vanety of reasons, but
they all had a significant impact on the way films were presented during the era
Immediately follOWing the war. Demilitanzation of Germany made linle sense by 1947
when the Cold War began to dominate Allied thoughts and policy and when it became
apparent that an armed Germany would act as a buffer between the Soviet Union and
54
the West; Denazification had been impractical because of the magnItude of conducting
Investigations on every person pla~~d In a position of authority: Deindustriallzation
never got off the ground because of the realization that a strong Gennan economy
would also be useful as a buffer to the Soviet Union; Instilling collective guilt could not
be accompltshed because of practical matters relating to food and housing for t:
Germans; and nonfratemization between American occupying forces and Gennan
citizens was totally unenforceabJe.<J.I
So those responsible for the IYel1 im Film series set out immediately with an
agenda that emphasized "unconditional surrender," with initial issues using such titles
and tenninology as "Gennany is Beaten," the Gennan surrender is "unconditional" and
"absolute," and the defeat of Germany by the Allies is "complete and final" ~5 But
those themes would last only a short while, and in August 1945, coinciding with the
move of the Welt 1m Film operation from London to Munich in the zone of Gerrnany
occupied by the United States, the series opened a new era. the "Infonnational Era."
which lasted throughout most of 1946 and into 1947.
Analysis of Issue No. 13
The food shortage In Gennany was a key element of issue No. 13,"" which \4,'as
released around 10 August 1945. Agriculture endeavors showing men and women
working In the fields were used to emphasize the point that --(,;very square meter" of
available land must be used for the production of food. The issue contained a segment
of Truman arriving in Gennan)' and being greeted by Russian and American officers,
and states that Truman. along with other Allied offiCIals, "find a destroyed Berlin."
-
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A segment depicting children playing on former Nazi antiaircraft guns is
accompanied with the narration, "weapons of war are now toys for children." Scenes of
destruction from around Germany prevail in Issue No. 13, and the narrator says that the
scenes are similar to those seen in London some five years before.
The "Informational" Era
August 1945-July 1947
The shift in emphasis for Welt im Film from psychological warfare to
presentation of information came in August 1945, when the newsreel began allowmg
Germans themselves to speak to their fellow citizens, courtesy of British members of
the newsreel team. The lessons were clear. They extolled the virtues of democracy, of
bringing up children in a wholesome environment, and of being "honest and tolerant
human beings."'!7
While the content of Well un Film was always of primary importance, certaIn
underlying issues had developed by early 1946. What to show the Germans seemed to
be the easy part. But establishing a quadripartite effort with cooperation from all four
Allied powers occupying Germany, presenting material in a timely manner, and
maintaining cooperation between various newsreel and film-making agencies for
suitable exchange of footage, all were areas of concern among American military
leaders.
But first, the content of Welt im Film; what it was to show, and perhaps more
importantly, what it was not to show. The original tenets of film policy for occupied
Gennany included the education of the Germans in Western ways. But along with such
educational efforts came the continued need to remind Germany of the devastation it
--
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had wrought, and to warn its citizens of consequences If further hostile efforts were
undertaken. A memorandum circulated by the U.S. InfonnatlOn Control Division on 16
August 1945, at the virtual outset of the lnfonnational era of vVel1 1m Ftfm, tells of the
need to present the news as ""a lesson, a reminder, and a warning." But how receptive
would Gennan audiences be to such an approach? And how attentive would they be to
the lessons offered?
Gennans on the whole are receptive and the overall reaction IS favorable.
Attendance ranges from capacity to satisfactory. And yet we all realize
that once this novelty has worn off (in Berlin it has already) we shall find
it increasingly difficult to deliver our lessons straight Will the Gennans
come m week after week to play the guilty pupil? Sure enough we will
be showing them our feature film. pure entertainment along with the
documentaries. They will come in all right. Only we may find them
dozing apathetically through these documentaries and educational
newsreels -- to be bright and ready for Rita Hayworth in ("over (;irl. .. 'IX
In September 1945, film policy officials established a "General Outline of
Policy" that actually set footage percentages for coverage of national and internatIOnal
events. Domestic Gennan stories would comprise 40 percent of each newsreel issue,
Bntish stones, 20 percent, U.S. stones, 20 percent, and others, 20 percent. The General
Outl ine of Pol icy ordered that the 40 percent of domestic Gennan content would
III ustrate "( a) ReVIval of freedom of thought and expreSSIOn and the exchange of Ideas,
withm the framework ofl.C.D. policy Instruction NO.2 dated 4th September 1945, (b)
Allied assistance m Gennan rehabilitatIon in the fields of reconstruction,
re-establishment of peaceful mdustry and ablTiculture, transportation, health services,
educatIOn, etc. and (c) War guilt tnals." '1<)
From Britain and the United States. according to the poliCy, content should be
devoted to Allied efforts at maintainmg peace, examples of democracy at work in those
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countries, reportage of important news events, and ill ustration of postwar reconstructIOn
and other problems outside Germany. 10<1
A Joint Newsreel Control Board was established by Britain and the United
States in early 1946, and adhering to overall Allied film policy, established a set of
directives to Welt im Film Outpost Assignment Desks. The directives, like those of
general film policies listed above, were fairly rigid. And although they illustrated the
total extent of military control of the series, they also portrayed the level of
sophIstication the series had reached compared to the early "psychological warfare"
days.
The dIrectives issued by the Joint Newsreel Control Board are as follows:
I. The object of the Joint US-British Newsreel operation, "Welt im
Film," is "... to contribute to the enlightenment of Germans and
Austrians by presenting news in pictures from throughout the world,
IncludIng the four zones of occupatIOn in Germany, and from Austna.
2. The following excerpts from the basic a!:,'Teement wi II indicate the
channels into which we are to direct our efforts:
3. In pictures from occupied countries the aIm should be to assIst the
Control authorities and to show reconstruction and restoratlon,
particularly through the efforts of the local population.
4. The object of the newsreel is to keep the Gem1an people Informed of
those current events which are likely to have a bearing on then lives. To
stimulate interest, the reel must also have entertamment value, but this is
definitely secondary in importance.
5. Humor and documentary Items, which cannot be classed stnctly as
news, may be included when they contribute directly to the object of
establishmg a peaceful, tolerant and democratic Germany.
6. Deprivation suffered ... in consequence of the war should be
emphaSIzed.
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7. Items illustrating military pomp and display, or celebrating the Allied
vIctOry over the Germans, shall be Included only when they are of
first-class news value, and emphasis on them should be avoided.
8. A sectIOn of the newsreel shall be devoted to sports items...
9. The newsreel presents essentially the Allied view of world events,
including German and Austrian events, and therefore must be subject to
control.
10. This control is vested in the Joint Newsreel Control Board, which
transmits its directives to the Joint Editorial Board in Munich.
11. If at any time a question of policy anses In connectIOn with the
shooting of a news story, please get in touch at once with the Managing
Editor. 101
The objective of most of these directives seemed to be in establishing Well Jm
Film as a legitimate newsreel, providing information to an information-starved
Germany. But the guilt element of "deprivation suffered" is also present in the
directives, along with a de-emphasis on the "pomp and display" of the Allied victory
over the Germans.
"The object of IVel1 1/11 Film is to contrihute to the enlIghtenment of Germans
and Austrians by presenting news in pIctures from throughout the world, mcluding the
four zones of occupation in Germany, and from Austria," a policy statement Issued in
early 1946 said. But the newsreel should present "essentially the Allied view of world
events, mcluding German and Austrian events, and therefore must be subject to
control. ,- IO~
The result was a newsreel that provided information to the Germans. tempered
the Allied victory celebration to a degree, but kept a certam emphasis on guilt and




these guilt and devastation elements, despite the overall effort to move into the realm
of news and portrayal of actual events.
During the lnfonnational period, many themes ran through Well 1m Film, but
certain ones were more prominent than others. The delivery of food to various areas of
Germany was stressed, apparently to emphasize the good will of the Allies toward their
fonner enemies. In August 1946, Ray A loanes, chief of the Rationing Section
Economics Division of the Office of Military Government for Germany, provided a list
to ~'Velt 1m Film officials of people who would provide information on food import
operations throughout the country. [oanes provided information on food import
operations in Bremen, Bavaria and Berhn, Incoming fish deliveries from the
ScandinaVian countries, and also provided the names of contact people for tours of
miJls, factories and storage facilities involved in the food distribution effort.)()J This
goodwilj theme had become prominent in WeI, 1m him by mid-1946. Allied film
officials were anxious to " ... arouse lots of goodwill ... " throughout the occupied
zones j().l
Late in 1945, the effort was to emphasize devastation of the major cities of
Germany, but to also include a secondary element of rebuilding. )O~ By March 1946,
story selectJOn for Wei, 1m Film had shifted its focus to the reconstruction of shattered
German dwellings and away from the presentation of images of the destruction of those
dwellings. Communications and transportation improvements were also emphasized,
along with the revival of free speech, press and political activity. A list of subjects to
be presented In rVel1 1m Film provided in a March 1946 report by the Newsreel
Assignment Desk included segments on a convention of newspaper licensees, football
-
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between Stuttgart and Frankfurt, Radio Frankfurt, vocatIOnal training, Gen. Patton's
funeral, the opening of new bridges, an air raid shelter convened Into a hotel, a VISIt of
Russian correspondents to Frankfurt, the hanging ofKarJ von Wiegand, a nutrition
check on German civilians, renewed operation of the Dunlop Tire factory, a Communist
Party meeting, an ice show, and elections in Obernhain. !()(,
The list illustrates the basic themes of food and nutrition, economic
development, democracy in action, the continued Russian alliance, spons and
entertainment, and, of course, the punishment theme that continued to linger from the
"psychological warfare" era of Well zm Film.
The newsreel specifically avoided any indicatIon of a nft between the victOrIOUS
Allies, and this resolve to show unification was reflected in the handling of Winston
Churchill's famous "iron Curtain" speech in March 1946. The speech was reported In
very general terms in issue No. 44 of Well im Film, and no details of what Churchill
actually said were presented. 107
During this same time period, in early J946, U.S. film polICy makers also
became concerned with conVinCIng the Amencan people of the need for prolonged
occupation of Germany and for the appropriation of funds such occupation would
reqUIre over the years. Officials were searchIng for ways to produce films aimed at
German audiences as well as American audiences. The twofold purpose of such films
would be to emphasize "the continuing problems in Germany so as to convince
Americans of the need for prolonged occupation and for the appropnations which such
occupation will reqUIre over a period of years," and also '·to show them (German




worse or better than the rest ... that militant nationalism was in itself an affront to the
rights of other peoples ... that Nazi doctrines, in their will to dominate over other
nations, requIred from the Gennans themselves not discipline, but servitude." lOR
The Truman administration was also seeking matenal during thIS tIme to
illustrate to the American public the need for food imports into Germany. Welt 1m Film
officials were requested to supply footage on agriculture productIOn efforts, the average
daily Gennan ration, Swedish Red Cross work with Gennan children, and other
material dealing with the food supply theme. 10'1
Also by March 1946, British and U.S. film officials became engaged in a
fine-tuning exercise of Welt 1m Fzlm by initiating a "critique" of pending issues by
Bntish and Amencan film officers. What material to run was generally agreed upon,
but how much of a particular topic to run was causing some concern. The British
representatives of Welt WI Film, after revIewing issues 39, 40 and 41, noted that
ski-jumping had been featured in all three issues, and swimming in Austraha had been
presented tWIce. The British called such repetition "'monotonous. " II(J The Bntish also
expressed a desire to increase the amount of coverage of reconstruction efforts withi n
Gennany, and noted that certain stories shot earlier in the year by the Hamburg
newsreel team had not yet been included into any of the newsreel issues. J II
By the fall of 1946, Welt 1m Film officials were seeking material from a vanety
of sources, including footage shot in the United States for the purpose of presenting "a
pIcture of American life we can present the Germans which will give them something
to emulate," but by avoiding images of ""the antics of our flaming youth or our lunatic
fringe to the audience we are trying to educate."IJ2
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We want factual reports on America, and its progress in social life, in
science, in Industry, in education, housing, agriculture. A little of the
Miami Bathing Beauties, the Marmalade Queen of Weehauken, the
Pin-up Pretty from Peoria, jutterbuggers ... Light stutT, humorous
material, or sports items are very welcome as relief for our purpose... III
Analysis of Issue No. 82
Issue No. 82 of the senes,".1 a wrap-up of 1946, provides a look at prevailing
themes for that year. The issue provides some intriguing images that had been presented
In issues throughout the year.
The opening segment of Well 1m Film No. 82 deals with a traditional German
Nevv Year's celebration, the first the citizens of Gennany had enjoyed since before the
outbreak of hostilities In the late 1930s. Another segment shows a variation of the
"swords to plowshares" concept, with workers in a factory converting Nazi helmets into
various types of cook109 utensi Is, mcluding pots and pans. The narrator says the factory
is producing "not what they (the Gennan people) fear, but what they need." The war
trials in Nuremberg were emphaSized in this Issue, along with the first free elections for
Germans since the late 1930s. The segment on Nuremberg pomts out that the trials
themselves had ended on I October 1946, about three months before the release of
Issue No. 82, and also notes that of22 people on trial at Nuremberg, 12 were sentenced
to death. Nuremberg is referred to as "once a city of party rallies -- now IS a cIty of
redemption." The huge Nazi Party rally of 1934 depicted in Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph
(~(Ihe Will was held in Nuremberg, the "mythical" birthplace of NazIsm.
During a segment on free elections in Nuremberg, the narrator pOints out that
the election saw an 87 percent turnout, with the Christian SOCial Party v.-lnning the





Gennan and a team from Southern Gennany was used to illustrate that sports had been
revived in postwar Gennany.
[ssue No. 82 also contaIns a segment detailing a crackdown on those Involved In
the black market in Berlin, and depicts police rounding up citizens and taking them
away in a truck, presumably to prison. These people are referred to in the sCbTJnent as
"enemies of the state." A segment from Hamburg depicts the unloading of wheat, and
another of school children eating lunch illustrates the theme offeeding a hungry
Gennany and ensuring "that students eat healthy."
A segment of aircraft !andlng in Berlin symbolized the connecting of Germany
to the rest of the world. Berlin, the narrator says, has once again became "part of the
international air traffic" system. The issue presents images of German prisoners of war
returning from Britain, France, the United States and Russia, and the theme of
rebuilding from the ruins of the war is given considerably play. The narrator tells of a
"cleanup and buildup" campaign under way in Germany.
The issue also depicts a traditional presentation of "Kasperletheater," or "The
Punch and Judy Show," and German children are seen watching the puppet
presentation. Many of the children are at first horrified at the image of a dragon
attempting to eat one of the characters, and then are somewhat delighted that the dragon
is driven away.
Coal mining and the production of electricity in the Ruhr were depicted in issue
No. 82 as part of the rebuilding and economic development theme. A treaty between the
United States and Britain uniting the two zones of Germany under those countries'
control was also mentioned. The issue ends with images of pigs in a row and the
statement in German, "Have Lots of Pig." Pigs are a sign of good luck in Germany. and
the statement IS a traditIOnal "good Juck" expresslOn.
The Quadripartite Effort
In late 1945. well before the pro-CommunIst and antl-Communlst propaganda
battles of] 947 and beyond, United States military film officials sought a quadripartIte
newsreel effort. one produced by Britam. the United States, France and RussJa. the four
occupying powers. The purpose for such an effort was to project an image of Allied
unity. an Idea US. military officials viewed as extremely important. But such a joint
effort would never be. The idea got no further than preliminary discussion among
representatives of the occupying forces 10 early 1946, and passed into obliVIOn by the
end of 1947.
Issue No. 82 of Weir im Film, the J946 overview. contained a 35-second
segment (fairly long by newsreel standards) of military officials from the fOUI powers
convening in Berhn. The Russian representative was introduced to the Well Ifrr Film
audience along with military representatives from Britain, the United States and
France. II) Germany had barely entered into the Iron CurtaIn era. and the Cold War had
not yet gonen compJetely off the ground. The United States, under the leadership of
PreSIdent Harry S. Truman, was still interested in maintaming a good relationship with
the Russians. The idea seemed 10 be that ifthe United States was nice to the Russians,
the RUSSIans would somehow support the notion of a "free world'· in the Western
sense. 110
So throughout much of 1946, discussion of a quadripartite newsreel effort
continued among United States military officials. The idea had been batted around
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since the inception of Welt im Film, but apparently was first seriously discussed among
American military officials in November and December 1945. On 29 November 1945,
those involved in the U.S newsreel effort met and agreed that "Everything in our power
should be done to put the newsreel on a four Power basis, beginning with interchange of
newsreels and clips and moving toward a quadripartite newsreel for distribution in all
four zones. " 117 And a memorandum to Eric Clark, a deputy chief of the Fi 1m, Theater
and Music Section of the U.S. Infonnation Control Service, dated 4 December 1945,
provided points that should be covered when prepanng for a quadnpartite effort. The
memo emphasized the need for a joint effort among the four occupational forces, and
sought an agreement from France and Russia to improve the newsreel "as much as
possible and (to) giving it the widest possible infonnation base." 118 The
memorandum, and all others obtained by this author, contained no infonnatlOn that
would indIcate a desire on the part of U.S. military officials to exert control over the
project, and in fact, a very benevolent and cooperative attitude seemed to prevail.
In early January 1946, Nicholas Nabokoff, another deputy chief of the Film,
Theater and Music Control Section of the U.S. Infonnation Control Service, asked ofa
staff member, "What is -- from our viewpoint -- the most functional way In whIch the
RUSSians and French could participate in the (at the present time) Anglo American
newsreel in order to render this newsreel a quadripartite Allied venture')" 11'1 So the
questions bemg asked by American military officials were not "should weT' but "how
can weT
Efforts to develop such a JOInt effort began to fade late in 1946, however, as
Americans and British alike began to realize the magnitude of Russia's resolve to place,
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in the words of Winston Churchill in March 1946, an "iron curtain" across Gennany
between the East and the WeSl. 120
Newsreel Clip Excbang~
During the time period that U.S. military officials were stressing the importance-
of a quadripartite endeavor by all occupational powers, they were also urging a
newsreel clip exchange program between Welt In? hIm and other newsreels, hath inside
the occupied zones of Gennany and elsewhere. Like the quadripartite effort in general,
U.S. military authorities were interested In the exchange between Wdt WI Film and
newsreel endeavors in the French and Russian zones ofoccupied Gennany "as a
symbol of Allied unity to the Gennan people." J21 The effort to develop an exchange
program with French and Russian newsreels was consistent with the desires of U.s
military officials to developed an overall quadripartite newsreel project. Il2
United States authorities were also encouraging exchange programs WIth
newsreels produced in other European countries and in the Unl1ed States as well. A
Swedish newsreel known as ,)'vensk hlmmJu,,·trt sought an exchange or newsreel
footage with Welt 1m Fdm late in 1947,12.\ and later (July 1948), dunng the
"'Anti-Communist Propaganda" period of rVe/t wll'·rlm, newsreel enterprises operatmg
in the United States such as Murch of (mIl.! began seeking clips from Well In] Film. I.:~
Exchanges had been initiated earlier between Welt 1m !'tIm and such newsreel
productions as ACluu!rtcs FruncUiser.\ (;uumon! Iirilish. Novost, /)niu, (VJl::'fl ve Filmu
and (In/() News. The result of these exchanges was an impressive array of international
stories for presentation by all of the newsreel s. 12'
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Because the actual operation of Welt im Film was in Germany and because of
the accessibility producers had to the various events and incidents occurring in the
zones occupied by the British and the United States, material from the series was in
great demand from other commercial producers by mid-1947. Various companies
sought library material from Well im Film for feature film productions, and the British
counterpart to March olTime, a series known as Modern Age, sought material from
Well im Film as well. U.S. film officials pondered over the means of making footage
available to commercial producers "on equal terms." 126
Questions now arises (sic) whether "Welt im Film" material should be
made available for feature production and on what basis. Being
Government operated we consider that "Welt im Film" material would
have to be made available to all that might ask for it on equal terms and
that such tenns should be based on normal commercial rates now
applying in the U.S. Sale would have to be made from "Welt im Film"
library in Munich directly. Rawstock required for making of prints or
lavenders of material would have to be provided by buyer. 127
In February 1946, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made a dIrect request
of Well im Film officials that German-Austrian material contained in the series "be
offered (to) commercial companies for U.S. release." Byrnes noted that Welt 1/11 Film
issues 22 through 26 dealing with Dachau orphans, Gis on a Danube boat pleasure trip,
the Arlberg Express reopening, the Isch! Festival, the removal of a swastika from a
Hamburg trade union building, theaters opening in Munich, and the licensing of the first
Gennan newspaper following the war were "highly desired" by U.S companles. 12X
Timeliness of News Reports
From the outset, Welt fm Film was plagued with logistIcal problems, and




of hostilities, Allied forces had shut down all movie theaters, and began reopening them
one by one only after licensing procedures were established. As more and more theaters
were allowed to ope~ the demand for limited copies of ltd/1m him began to grow,
and presentations in theaters would eventually lag behind the actual event by as much
as I8 weeks. 13O During the early part of 1946, the number of theaters licensed to
operate increased dramatically, but the number of Well 1m Film copies distributed to the
various zones did not. In Bavaria alone, some 200 civilian movie theaters were in
operation by the end ofApril 1946, yet only 30 copies of Welt /In j;rlm were available
for distribution each week. HI Nearly a year and a half later, in September 1947, a total
of 471 theaters had been approved for operation in Bavaria, yet the number of copies
available for distribution of Well im FIlm had only been increased by three, 10 33. 112
Efforts by film officials to increase the number ofcopies made earlier in 1947 had been
10 no avail, 13' apparently because of limited funds available for the projectLi-l The
problem \vas not being taken lightly by film authorities. As one official put it in a
January 1947 memorandum, "It becomes a joke when the Christmas issue is screened
during Easter." He wen1 on to note that with more theaters due for opening, "the
situation will become worse." 135
Other factors also caused delays in presenting material. In February 1946,
theaters were apparently being licensed in the British Zone at a much greater rate than
in the American lone. Records show that as of 17 December 1945,81 newsreel prints
were available for distribution in the American Zone, which had 310 theaters operating
at the time, and 91 were avallable for distribution in the British Zone, where 770
theaters were in operation With nearly two and a halftimes the number of theaters in
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operation in the British Zone than in the American Zone, and only 10 additional copies,
British officials sought a more equal distribution of copies. 136
At one point in early 1946, film officials transferred printing of Well ,m Film
issues bound for Bert in from Munich to Berlin in hopes of speeding up the process. But
the effort actually produced greater delays because of slower processing in Berlin, and
audiences there were seeing issues one week later than audiences in other occupied
areas. IJ7 That situation was corrected in May 1946 with a transfer of some of the
copying duties back to Munich and a speeded up schedule in Berlin. 1.1R
Tbe "Anti-Communist Propaganda" Era
Of Welt im Film, July 1947-June 1952
By mid-July 1947, Welt im Film began to undergo another change. One of the
primary images produced by the series prior to that time was one of Allied unity, that IS,
unity among the four forces occupying Germany -- BritaIn, the United States, France
and Russia. But with increasing pressure to match pro-CommunIst propaganda being
produced by the Russians for East German consumption, American and British military
officials began changing their view on the unity issue, and criticism of the SovIet Union
began to creep into the Welt im Film series in August 1947.
But the emphasis of Welt im Film during the early part of 1948 on humanitarian
efforts toward the Germans continued, and themes of rebuilding a devastated Germany
and providing its citizens with essential needs dominated. In March 1948, military film
officials sought maximum radio and newsreel coverage of the arrival and distribution of
donated food and clothing from the United States. The cargo, arriVing on the U.S. ship
"Gretna Victory," represented "the intangible spirit of helpfulness, encouragement and
pi
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good neighborliness which prompted and attended the collection and dispatch of these
gifts," accordIng to the ship's commander, Capt. CharlesR. Jeffs, U.s Navy. I.N
There exist no doubt that the gifts of food and clothing stored in the
holds of thIS ship wiJ1 be most gratefully received by the hungry and
needy people of Germany and Austria. But the most valuable cargo
which this shIp carries, it seems to me, and the cargo which will be more
appreciated than even the highly-prized material gifts, is an intangibk-
substance Into whIch the stevedores will be unable to sink their hook~
but yet is to be found in all of this ships holds. It is the spirit of
helpfulness, encouragement and good neighborliness which prompted
and attended the collection and dispatch of these gifts. 140
The ship, loaded with 3,000 tons of food and clothIng donated by people of the
Northwestern United States, docked in Bremen on 9 March ]948. School children were
given a holiday to greet the ShlP and to participate in the ensuing ceremonies. At the
Bremen docks, the cargo was transferred from the ship and loaded into "the Friendship
TraIn," bound for various cities throughout Germany. Accommodations for German
press representations were provided on the train, so that military officials were able to
maximize coverage not only in newsreels, but among local publications and broadcast
stations as well. The event was designed to draw extensive coverage at dockside in
Bremen, but was also designed to pick up press coverage along the way.
Official ceremonies are planned in Bremen on Wednesday, and
Wednesday evening or early Thursday the Friendship Tram will depart
for Dusseldorf in the British Zone where ten cars will be detached with
appropriate ceremonies. From there, the train will proceed to Mainz In
the French Zone where another ten cars will be detached and from there
to Frankfurt where fifteen cars will be detached. The remammg cars will
then be brought to Berlin.
Appropnate ceremomes are planned at each of the stops and it is deSired
that full publicity be given this project. ...
..
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In connection with the March Food Publicity Campaign, it IS desired that
as much publicity as possible be gIven the tram through the German
d d· I~lpress an ra 10....
Weir 1m Film officials were notified on 9 July 1948 of the arrival the follmvmg
day of U.S. Rep. Stefan, an ""important member of AppropriatIons Committee," wh()
would be presenting $1,000 for food from an American CIty to the town of Kamen,
Germany, located some 70 miles from Dusseldorf. U"elt 1m Film officials were
Instructed to give the event "all possible publICity, for obvIOUS reasons." l~~
In addition to the food and clothing goodwill theme, others remained in the
series throughout the anti-Communist propaganda period. Economic development
remained hIgh on the list of themes to emphasize. Central to the economIc development
theme presented in Weir im Film during the early part of 1948 was coal mInLng in Ruhr
Military officials saw the need to increase coverage of Ruhr industrial activities to
illustrate Its Importance to the overall recovery of the German economy.
The Military Governors of the U.S. and British Zones of occupIed
Germany have acknowledged the pnmary Importance or coal productIOn
to the recovery of the entire German economy. the economy of Western
Europe and the success of the ECA. ... It IS believed that virtually every
release of Die Welt im Film contains one clip whose commentary could
Include a perfectly legitimate commercial plug for Ruhr coal mmlng.I~J
In addition to illustrating economic recovery brought about by Bntish and U.s
efforts. the idea was to "keep the Ruhr area before the minds of the public'· for needed
public support In the area of labor recruitment and food shipments required to maIntain
coal productlOn.:-I-1
I WIsh to take this opportunity to emphaSIze to you the vital Importance
of the mission which has been given to this office by General Robertson
and General Clay. to vastly Increase the scope of the PubliC Relations
actIvities concerned with the productIon of coal and steel In the Ruhr.
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Our mission IS not only to publicize all German matters in the Ruhr
areas, but also to reach the German people in all of the Western Zones to
the end of increasing labor recruitment and to obtain willingly from the
German people the additional increments of food required to maintam
coal production. 145
The series continued to emphasize the "virtues of democracy" theme throughout
the period. In June 1948, extensive coverage was given to a German journalist visiting
the United States to illustrate freedom of the press. Film offiCials wanted to "stress that
Mr. Reger (Eric Reger, the visiting journalist), like any working journalist in the United
States, had free access to information from everywhere on the highest levels." 140 A
script guide for a Welt im Film segment provides an outline of the visit:
Sequence I - Eric Reger arrives at Mitchell Field. First working journalist
to visit the United States from postwar Germany, he is greeted by Lieut.
Col. William A. Curtin, Executive Officer, and other CAD officials. Mr.
Reger is in the United States to study first-hand the Press In a
democracy.
Sequence 1I - Mr. Reger goes immediately to the Journalism Library at
Columbia University, New York City, where he assists In prepanng
materials for the Mumch Press Exhibit. With him are Mr Elmer Cox.
OMGUS Press Control Officer, and other journalists.
Sequence III - Mr. Reger consults with two top editors In their otlices at
the New York Times: Mr. Lester Market and Mr. Sheppard Stone. In the
two-shot, Mr. Market and Mr. Reger discuss the need for more frequent
cooperation between German and American journalists
Sequence IV - Mr. Reger has free access everywhere to the news and
news-makers. Here he visits New York City's piers where ships are
loaded with foodstuffs, oil and machinery to aid European recovery
Sequence V - Mr. Reger goes to United Nations headquarters at Lake
Success, Long Island where the General Assembly is in session. As a
working newspaperman he takes a seat In the press gallery together with
reporters from other nations.
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Sequence VI - Mr. Reger is greeted by government officials upon his
arrival at Union Station, Washington. He tours the capitol's historical
sights. On the capital steps he confers with Senator Ball of Minnesota.
As guest of the Senator he attends a session of the House of
Representatives to hear discussion on the Marshall Plan for European
RecoveT\'.
At the National Gallery of Art he notes the popularity of the German art
treasures on display there. He visits the Lincoln Memorial, national
shrine for Americans; the Washington Monument: the world-famous
cherry trees along the Potomac. And his three-day visit is filled with
talks with average citizens and influential editors like Dick Hollander of
the Washington Daily News.
Mr. Reger climaxes his Washington stay by attending a White House
press conference where the President's press secretary is breaking
important news. Mr. Reger notes the complete freedom with WhlCh
correspondents cover top-level news sources in the United States.
Sequence VII - Mr. Reger reports on his United States Impressions in a
"Voice of America" broadcast to the Gennan people. He compares notes
with a Gennan girl now studying at Briarcliff College.'~7
While the food and clothing distribution efforts were hailed in Welt im Ftlm as
humamtarlan efforts by citizens of the United States. and while economic development
was presented as aJoint U.S. and British effort, no specific comparisons were made
between the way the Western Allied powers and the way the Soviet Umon were
perfonning in this area. But the transition of Welt 1m Film into a full-blown
anti-Communist propaganda effort was just around the comer. Officials continued to
emphasize humanitarian efforts without reference to Soviet activIties through May, 14~
but by July, it was clear that the series was destmed to become a medium of exclusive
anti-Communist propaganda. A memo from the Office of Military Government for
Germany on 23 July 1948 offers a statement on the intent ofa Berlin supplement to
We/t 1m Film:
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This division has, for the past four weeks, produced a weekly
supplement to the official Anglo-American Military Government
newsreel "Welt im Film," dealing with the Berlin situation. This Berlin
supplement to the newsreel is of a political, informative nature and is
intended to bring the situation in Berlin before the eyes of the movie
audience~ in the 2,800 cinemas of the U.S. and U.K. zones of Germany
and Austria, to counteract communist propaganda. The special Berlin
supplement will be contmued weekly until further notIce. l~lJ
Meanwhile, in the Soviet sector of Germany, the newsreel Der Augerceuge. a
Well 1m Film East German counterpart, had undergone its ovm evolution. The newsreel,
also known as Deulsche Film-Akliengesel/schafi (The Eyewitness), began operations in
February 1946. At first, the senes had kind words for all of the Allies, and, like Well 1m
Film, endorsed a theme of unity among Allied occupatIOnal forces. This lasted through
1947 and Into 1948. But by the fall of 1948. the series was suddenly transformed Into a
Communist propaganda instrument, and people such as Winston Churchill who been
formerly praised were now portrayed as Western ImperialIsts. ISO
But the shift by Well 1m Film to match pro-CommunIst propaganda by 1kr
A ugen:::euge and other Soviet projects was cautious because of a fear among All ied
officials that the Germans would view Well im Film as an obvious propaganda tool and
not take it seriously. The first IndicatIOn that Well im Film would take a new course In
what was to be presented came in July ]947, when the Joint Newsreel Control Board
Issued the following policy statement follOWIng a meeting with newsreel editors:
It was agreed that the newsreel editors should hereafter deal frankly With
political and other provocative issues provided that due care would be
taken to present the respective viewpoints objectively and fairly .... In
general the JNCB undertook to serve as a shield for the editors so long
as they would continue to treat every subject as news and thus to prevent
the newsreel from becoming an obvious instrument of propaganda, as
were the newsreels of the Nazi days. lSI
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Within a month of this statement, Welt im Film offered its first crittcism of the
Soviet Union. A segment in issue No. 117 dealt with the poor physical condition of
prisoners of war returning from Russia. 152 In October, it was apparent that the United
States had changed the course of Welt im Fibn and other film efforts entirely.
Because of the harsh and haseless attacks against the United States, its
policies, and its principles made by Soviet-sponsored and licensed
information media in Germany, U.S. Military Government on 28
October became an educational and informational program to explain to
the German people the basic concepts of democracy as opposed to the
communistic system. 153
When the United States first began to change the tone of Well un Film during
the second half of 1947, the Hritish were reluctant to go along with the new direction of
the newsreel series, and instructions came '"from the highest quarter" that the Iine of
British controlled suurces of information in Germany was not to be changed in this
respect 15-1 But that reluctance was to change in 1948 as the Soviet Union increased its
own confrontational tone.
On 24 June 1948, Joseph Stalin ordered a blockade orthe non-Commul1Ist zones
of Berlin, hoping to squeeze out the Allies and annex their zones to East Germany. The
Allies responded with an extraordinary effort now known as the Berlm AIrlift, during
which 2.5 million tons of supplies were flown into the besieged city during a period of
less than a year. The airlift lasted 321 days, and ended only after Stalin lifted the
blockade on 12 May 1949.'55 The Berlin blockade and consequent airlift caused the
British to rethink their position of keeping Welt 1m Film out of the realm of
'"anti-Communistic warfare," and once the airlift began, the newsreel became a
...... -
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full-blown mouthpiece for the western side in the emerging Cold War without British
0pposltlOn. The series remained in that mode for its durallon.
Berlin Airlift operations and related top~cs dominated Wei, 1m Ftlm from June
1948 to May 1949. E\ery issue contained scenes from the Allied effort. mcludmg
aircraft crash scenes and other unfortunate incidents that occurred along the way.
apparently in an attempt to project rVel/ 1m Film as a truthful nev,'sTeel series rather than
as a propaganda tool. Concern for how the German audiences perceived tt'clt Inl FJlm
had been on All ied policy-makers minds from the outset. That was the pri mary reason
execution scenes were dropped from the earliest Issues, and that is why Allied offiCIals
went to great lengths to ensure that the senes was not viewed by the Gennans as a
propaganda tool, which would have destroyed its effectiveness.
Dunng the height of the Berlm Airlift, issues of Well 1m hIm emphasized the
Allied effort to supply Gennans with food and other essentials The issues during thIS
period were also very critical of Soviet activities, and state that power shonages and
lImitations on public transportation were due to the Soviet blockade of Berlm because
of coal shonages. The Berlin Airlift is referred to in ~{/el( 1m Frlm sehrments as ""the
blggest achievement in flight history:' and the narrator notes that some 2.5 million
people were being supported by the airlift. The airlift, according to the narrator,
"demonstrates how strong the AllIes are:' and tells of the Allied detenTIlnatJOn in the
effort so that Berlin "wilJ not be a victim of the blockade." ISh
A segment In the early days of the blockade tells of Russian promises to provide
food to hungry Gennans, but that those promises were never fulfilled The narrator says
that "Berliners know the Allies are the best guarantee against hunger .. A segment also
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depicts a huge rally held in the Schoeneberg District of Berlin fOT Germans of West
Berlin "to continue the tight" against ..the rape of the soul, the body and the mind" by
the Soviet Union. ls7 It was in this same district some 13 years later that President John
F. Kenney made his famous "1ch bin ein Berliner" speech.
Welt im Film After the Berlin Airlift
By the time the British withdrew from the Well im Film project in June 1950,
other commercial newsreels had begun to appear on the West German scene, providing
some competition tor the U.S.-operated series. Neue lJeulsc;he Wochensc;!zuu, for
example, appeared in January] 950. It carried the same name of a series that had run in
Nazi Gennany during the war, and was actually produced by the West German
government, but the connections between the Nazi series and the new one are too few
to mention. ls8 By the time Welt im Film passed into history in June 1952, after 369
issues, several other newsreels, including {Ifa, later called (Ifa-Juhel, and 7e/( un/er da
Lupe had appeared.'5,) These newsreels lasted until 1978, when most German newsreels
ceased operatIOn altogether.
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Application of Propaganda Techniques
The careful selection of malenal for J,-Vef, 1m Film presentatIOn as ill ustrated in
written pol icy and in correspondence between military film officials after the war
makes it clear that propaganda techniques developed from the early part of the 20th
century through the World War II period were employed in production of the series.
Haro~d D. Lasswell defined propaganda as "the technique ofintluencing human action
by the manipulation of representatiOns." J Definitions by Carl Hovland, ~ LW. Doob, ~
and others apply directly to the methods used in the production of the Hlell 1m Film
senes.
It appears that producers of ~j/el, im Film believed in prevailIng "magic bulleC
and "hypodermic needle" theories of communication effects. They apparently believed
that the presentations In j,Vell 1m Film would brreatly Influence all of those in the
German audiences uniformly. But since those theories were first postulated, research
has ShOVvTl that Important intervenmg vanables such as demographic background or
audience members influence reactions to messages and Images being presented. 4
The process of manipulatlOg the representations of IIVel1 1m Film sebrrnents In all
three eras under study began with the story selection process, continued through the
music and narration dubbing process, and was even maintained after the Issues were
released to movie theaters with high-level criticIsm and orders for corrective actIon for
future issues.;'
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"'Newsreel" as a Misnomer
The primary difference between an actual news presentatIon and a presentation
designed specifically to persuade the audience to accept a certain view is the manner in
which material is selected and presented based on a partIcular philosophy. The
philosophy behind an ideal news presentation does not include means of persuasion.
News is presented without regard to audience reaction and with no intent to persuade
the audience to accept or reject specific points of view. News is presented merely to
offer information on matters that have an impact on the audience
It is for this reason that "newsreel" as it applies to Well im Film, and as it
applies to many other such endeavors as well. IS a mIsnomer, for the "news" presented
to German movie audiences was not news at all, but a carefully manipulated
presentation designed to persuade the Germans to accept certain philosophies and ideas.
The series demonstrates that certain media can have the semblance of news
presentations. but are not actually news presentations at all.
Raymond Fielding suggests in March oj Time. /935-1951 that newsreels were
mtended to playa propaganda role. C] He maintams that newsreels offered only a very
superficial look at the news, and actually misrepresented reality. He points out In llze
American Newsreel. /911-1 Y67 that newsreels often "created" scenes that did not eXist
in fact 7 It is for these reasons, according to Fielding, that newsreels lost credihility after
World War II when television took over as the primary prOVIder of visual news.
This study has allowed the author to make several conclusions related 10 the
evolution of the Well 1m Film series and to the content of the vanous eras. The series
89
underwent significant changes at various points in its seven-year history, and those
changes have been traced through the three eras of Welt 1m Film dealt wIthin thIs thesIs.
The more obvious conclusions include the actual dIvision of the three eras. The
first, under the operation of a unit known as the "Psychological Warfare" DIvision, ran
from May 18, ]945, the date of first issue, just days after the end of hostilities in
Europe, unO I around the middle of August of that year. The abrupt change from the
"PsychologIcal Warfare" era to the "lnfonnational" era came after negative audience
reaction to execution scenes depicted in the first I0 issues. From August 1945 unti I
around the middle of 1<)47, the newsreel took on a legitimate air, one ofinfonnation
and educatIOn, although obviously presented for maximum propaganda value. The shift
from the Infonnation era to the Anti-Communist Propaganda era was a bit more
gradual, but can be seen distInctly in letters between Allied film officials In late 1947
and early] 948. The Welt im Film issues of that period themselves, however, provide
the best illustration that they were anti-Communist propaganda.
The various eras are represented by documents and Welt 1m Film Issues that
illustrate the prevailing themes of those eras.
Prevailing Themes in Psychological "Variare Era
The prevailing themes of the PsycholOgIcal Warfare era are eVIdenced In the
actual issues of Welt im Film from that period. Others have viewed and analyzed the
first 10 Issues of Welt im Film and have offered various descnptlOns. After executIOn
scenes were dropped following the first ten issues, certain themes associated with this
era remained, but new ones from the emerging InfonnatlOn era were also present. Much
of the footage presented in Welt im Film issue No. 13, which was released during the
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transitional period from the first era to the second, dealt with bombed out cities. But
themes of rebuilding, feeding Germany, and Allied unity were also present
From mfonnation provided by SmIthers and others, it can be concluded that
these themes prevailed by design, springing from stnct Allied film policy. Even the
time to be allotted to the various topics was a subject of discussion in planning for each
Issue.
Prevai ling Themes of the Informational Era
As Welt im Film entered into the Infonnational era, themes of rebuilding, of
providing food to hungry Europeans, and of democracy at work were emphasized, and
those dealing with punishment and of destruction were de-emphasized. Making the
Gennans feel guilty for the war and the devastation that resulted from their country's
actions were maintained, but were secondary to the themes of rebuilding and providing
food and clothing to those In need. Sports activities such as football and skiIng also
prevailed, and each issue contained such segments. Allied unity was also a prevaihng
theme during this period, although umty With the Soviet UnIOn was emphaSIzed less
and less as the era wore on into early 1948.
Prevailing Themes of the Anti-Communist Propaganda Era
Segments emphasizing U.S. and British efforts to provide food, clothing and
other necessities to the Gennan people, along with rebuilding and economic
development themes, were maIntained during the Anti-Communist Propaganda era or
f;Velt 1m Film, but were contrasted with Soviet Union actlvlty, or lack of activity, in the
eastern sector of the country under USSR control. Those elements had been
incorporated into the senes almost from the outset, or at least since August 1945, bUt
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were now presented not only as U.S. and British goodwill endeavors, but as a means of
illustrating the difference in the way the Western AllIes were dealing with Germany and
the way the Soviet Union was dealing with their World War If enemy.
The contrasts in WeIr rm Film are obvious. During the Berlin Airlift period, for
example, from 24 June 1948 to ]2 May 1949, an issue ofthe series began wit~
factones and other facilIties turning "lights out" because of a power shortage caused oy
the Soviet blockade of Berlin. Other problems, such as Iimitations on public
transportation, were also emphasized and blamed directly on the blockade. But each
segment depicting the problems brought about by the blockade was followed with one
that illustrated the Western powers' determination to overcome them. Segments
showing the construction of new airfields, the arrival of U.S. and British aircraft at the
rate of one every one and a half minutes, huge amounts of food and other supplies being
unloaded, and coal mining for the production of electricity, all followed segments
illustrating the hardships brought on by the blockade, and all were accompamed by such
narration as "Berlin ""111 not be a victim to thl: blockade:' and "the people who started
the blockade were totally V\-Tong in thinking they could kill Berlin."
The Power of If'ell im Film Propaganda
With all of the careful manipulation of Well 17n FJlm material. with the
complicated rrocesses of approving segments for presentatIOn, and with all the
dilLgence that prevailed by Allied film offiCials in making sure just the nght material
was being presented in just the right way, it would appear that the AllIes would reap
benefits from the proJect. But the benefits are in doubt, because overall film propaganda
value is in doubt. Researchers know now that there is no '-magic hullet" or "hypodermic
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needle," and that many factors are at play that negate, or at least mmlmlze, any dIrect
impact such propaganda endeavors may have on audiences.
But a consensus that film could actually mold the Ideolo!:,')' of the masses had
developed dunng the years folloWIng World War Cthat the '"magic bullet"' could be
fired from the projector, and that those watchmg would be at Its mercy. ThiS consensus
remamed remarkably durable during and following World War II.
Thus there can be no doubt that the First World War represented a
smgularly important moment in the wider history of film propaganda.
The nature and extent of the war created an unprecedented need for
belligerent governments to win popular support for their war efforts, and
It was cmema's apparent ability to reach those mass audIences that made
It seem such an attractive weapon in this banJe for the hearts and minds
of ordinary people. But, not least because of the subsequent history of
film propaganda, the all-important question remains: did the weapon
work? Did it reach its target and did it then make the desired Impact on
that target? .. &
There IS eVIdence that fi 1m propaganda presented to British audiences at the
beginning of the First World War simply mirrored the anitude of the public at the tIme,
and that film propagandists found it harder and harder to find an acceptIng audience for
their presentatlOns as the public mood began to change.'"
In reality, growmg popular weariness and anger were the product both o1'a
changmg war situation that was increasmgly charactenzed by hIgher casualties and
apparent stalemate and of a changing domestic situation in which ever heavier burdens
were Imposed ITI ways that were mcreasingly seen to be unfim. Set alongside
developments of this significance, the official films played an increasmgly mITIor role In
the wartIme expenence. Equally, in the final months of the war, dramatic changes at the
front (with Germany apparently p01sed to defeat Britain) and Important changes at
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home (with new government policies to remedy the unfairness of the domestic burdens
of the war) were able to achieve what the films never could -- they dissipated the
weariness and redirected the anger, and the nation consequently united once more in its
hatred of the enemy and its determination to see the war through to a victorious
conclusion. In short, in all of this, the official films played very little, if any, part. For
while the propagandist believed that film propaganda played a key part in its battle to
win and retain the hearts and minds of the people, this does not in itself mean that il
did. In fact, while the nature of the history of propaganda is such that we can never be
entirely sure, in this particular case, the power of film propaganda does seem to have
been more mythical than real. 10
From this, one may conclude that the power of Well 1m Ftlm was likely more
mythical than real, and that changing conditions and everyday situations had a much
greater influence on the citizens of Gennany than any film propaganda effort could ever
have. Propaganda techniques were employed in Welt 1m Fdm by Allied officials simp~y
because It was believed at the time that they worked. BUI In the end, a realistic
presentation of events, wjthout the process of deliberate "manipulation of
representations," would likely have better served the Western Allies in convincing th<:
Gennans that they were ""'Tong in their World War l/ endeavors, that the Allies were
willmg to help feed and cloth the Germans and help them rebuilt theIr devastated
country, and that democracy 1s better than communism. [f all of these things were,
indeed, true, then reality would be enough to convince the Germans. The need to
manipulate that reality would not be necessary
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